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INDIANS, PEASANTS, AND THE STATE: THE GROWTH OF A COMMUNITY MOVEMENT IN THE ECUADORIAN ANDES

Tanya Korovkin

A CERLAC / FLACSO-Quito joint publication

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Abstract

In the 1980s and early 1990s Ecuador witnessed the rise of a powerful indigenous movement, raising questions about the position of the indigenous peasantry in peripheral capitalist societies. This study focuses on the relationship between the expansion of capitalist agriculture and the rise of an indigenous peasant movement in one such area - the province of Chimborazo in the Ecuadorian Andes. It is conducted in a historical-structural perspective, combined with elements of historical-cultural analysis. The main concern is with state-induced structural changes that facilitated the transformation of indigenous peasant communities with their distinct cultural identity into a major protagonist in agrarian struggles. It is argued that these struggles represent a communal alternative to the post-reform capitalist order in the Ecuadorian Andes, an order based on privately owned land of high productivity, and on state control of the economic and social infrastructure.

Indians, Peasants, and the State:
The Growth of a Community Movement in the Ecuadorian Andes

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In the 1980s and early 1990s Ecuador witnessed the rise of a powerful indigenous movement. At the national level, this movement came to be represented by the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities (ConFederación de Nacionalidades Ia&genas, CONAIE), which included Indian peasant communities of the Andean highlands along with native communities of the Amazon and coastal region. In 1990 CONAIE organized a nationwide indigenous uprising, which turned out to be especially strong among the indigenous peasantry in the Andes. Hundreds of thousands of Indians, in some areas with the support of mestizo peasants, blocked local highways and took over urban plazas. Their demands were focused mostly on land, but also included such issues as state services, cultural rights, and the farm prices of agricultural products.

These events raise questions about the position of the indigenous peasantry in peripheral capitalist societies. In the political economy school, the peasant sector is generally viewed as a "refuge" for impoverished and semiproletarianized rural families, and as a source of cheap seasonal labour for capitalist agriculture. As such, the sector is considered "functional" to the operation of the capitalist world economy (de Janvry 1982; de Janvry et al. 1989; Wallerstein 1989; Munck 1985). While this view may well be correct from a global economic perspective, it misconstrues the reasons for the persistence of the peasant sector in Latin America. These may have to do more with the uneven development of agrarian capitalism and with peasant resistance to proletarianization than with the supposed "functionalism" of the peasant economy. In the case of the indigenous peasantry, peasant resistance is also likely to be reinforced by ethnic antagonism between the vanquished indigenous population and mixed-blooded heirs of the Spanish conquistadors.

This latter, more historically specific understanding of the peasant sector has been developed by students of peasant movements working within a historical-structural perspective tempered with cultural analysis. In their view, peasant resistance to the commodification of the rural economy was a major source of peasant movements during the early expansion of the world capitalist system (Wolf 1968; Landsberger 1969; Scott 1976, 1977; Eckstein 1989). It is true that in most cases the peasantry lost this battle. Supported by the massive deployment of legal and repressive state apparatuses, commercial estates thoroughly displaced the peasant economy in areas of high agricultural productivity. Peasants were driven to lands ill suited to agriculture. Thus, the low-productivity areas became the peasants' refuge from capitalist expansion. What is frequently overlooked, however, is that over the past decades some of these areas have evolved into Indian strongholds from which indigenous people are attempting to redefine their relations with both capitalist agriculture and Western culture.[1]

This study focuses on the relationship between the expansion of capitalist agriculture and the rise of an indigenous peasant movement in one such area - the province of Chimborazo in the Ecuadorian Andes. It is conducted in a historical-structural perspective, combined with elements of historical-cultural analysis. The main concern is with state-induced structural changes that facilitated the transformation of indigenous peasant communities with their distinct cultural identity into a major protagonist in agrarian struggles. It is argued that these struggles represent a communal alternative to the post-reform capitalist order in the Ecuadorian Andes, an order based on privately owned land of high productivity, and on state control of the economic and social infrastructure.

From Peasant to Proletarian?
State and Culture in the Capitalist Transformation of the Latin American Countryside

Latin American agriculture has undergone profound changes in the last four decades. The sprawling semifeudal haciendas, once a dominant feature of

the Latin American countryside, have given place to medium- and large-sized capitalist farms. Despite this change, an impoverished and semi-proletarianized peasantry continues to exist. Only a small minority of peasants has been able to become viable commercial farmers; the majority has been turned into a pool of cheap labour for capitalist agriculture and urban economies. Given the slow growth of permanent employment in industry and capitalist agriculture, this situation has led to intensified seasonal migrations involving a variety of occupations: harvesting crops in the capitalist agricultural sector; temporary employment in construction; and an assortment of economic activities in the urban informal sector. In some cases rural migrants have been able to save enough money to invest in land or commercial agricultural inputs. More frequently, however, their earnings are barely sufficient to secure their subsistence. Thus, while instances of 're-peasantization" have been observed, the predominant trend seems to be towards "incomplete depeasantization" - towards, that is, a differentiation of the peasantry into a minority of prosperous commercial producers and a majority of impoverished and serniproletarianized peasants.[2]

The state has played an important role in this process, both as its catalyst and as a self-appointed mediator of the ensuing agrarian conflicts. Since the Second World War, seventeen Latin American countries have passed land reform legislation, most of them under the auspices of the UN Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) and the US government's Alliance for Progress. Typically, the reforms have had political as well as economic objectives. They have aimed at preventing the growth of the sort of peasant unrest that so alarmed the established political elites in the wake of the Cuban revolution. At the same time, they have meant to improve the performance of the agricultural sector - a major bottleneck in the process of import substitution industrialization (ISI). Land reforms implemented in this political and economic context have had a vertical and limited character, facilitating the transition from semifeudal haciendas dependent on bonded labour to capitalist farms based on wage labour, but having little effect on the distribution of land. In most cases only a small proportion of the peasantry (usually in politically troubled areas) have been able to get access to land. Moreover, further land redistribution has been blocked by the capitalist nature of postreform agriculture.[3]

Paraphrasing the well-known description of the fate of ISI in Latin America, it can be said that the 1970s witnessed the exhaustion of the easy stages of land reform. Most of the underutilized semifeudal estates had disappeared as a result of established land reform legislation. Next in line were the relatively efficient capitalist farms. Their expropriation would require large amounts of compensation, and would threaten to disrupt, at least temporarily, the flow of national revenues from exports and the provision of food to the cities. To revive land reform, a non-capitalist development strategy would have been necessary. In the political and economic context of the 1980s, however, such a strategy was not likely to be adopted. Most Latin American countries - their economies burdened by foreign debt, and the political left in disarray - opted for a neoliberal economic strategy, combining generous support for capitalist agriculture with policies of integrated rural development (IRD). This strategy was welcomed by development experts as an uncontroversial and apolitical solution to the problem of rural poverty.

Sponsored by the World Bank, the IRD strategy was designed to transform impoverished peasant producers into reasonably viable commercial farmers. IRD projects combined financial and technical assistance for peasant producers with investment in the development of physical and social infrastructure - irrigation canals, roads, safe drinking water, health, education, and so on. In this manner, they reinforced the trend towards the expansion of state services in rural areas apparent in most Latin American countries since the Second World War. Consistent with the neoliberal economic perspective, however, most state support went to large and medium capitalist farmers producing food and raw materials for the international and urban domestic markets. Worse, as time passed, the expansion of physical and social rural infrastructure in the peasant sector became subject to severe fiscal constraints as a result of government cutbacks. Conceived as a supplement for the development of capitalist agriculture and strangled by the shortage of funds, the IRD projects - like the land reform programs

before them - benefited only a small proportion of the peasantry.[4]

The state's failure to substantially improve the condition of the peasantry reinforced the structural trend towards the depeasantization of the Latin American countryside. While some peasants had been able to succeed at commercial farming thanks to land reform or rural development projects, a majority remained at or below the level of subsistence – semi-peasants/semi-proletarians desperately struggling against pauperization.

While the social implications of the state-sponsored capitalist modernization of Latin American agriculture have been widely discussed in the literature, its effect on peasant political mobilization has attracted less scholarly attention. Moreover, the existing analyses seem to be pointing in different directions.

Writing in the 1970s from a political economy perspective, Paige argued that the structural trend towards depeasantization changes the pattern of agrarian conflicts. Land conflicts, in his view, develop mostly on sernifeudal haciendas characterized by the predominance of bonded labour. As such they are bound to disappear in the process of capitalist transition, giving place to two new types of conflicts: labour conflicts involving agricultural labourers; and conflicts about agricultural prices and credit, which would involve small commercial farmers. The first type of conflict, in Paige's view, could give rise to agrarian revolutions if the process of the capitalization of agriculture (and, hence, the capacity of the landowning classes to make economic concessions to rural labour) lags behind the process of proletarianization among the peasantry. The major protagonists of these revolutions would be semiproletarianized peasants, who have weakened their ties with the land and developed a proletarian outlook through their migration to urban centres or capitalist plantations. Thus, in essence they would be proletarian, not peasant, revolutions (Paige 1975, 1983, 1985).

The historical evidence, however, casts doubt on Paige's conclusions. Land conflicts proved to be more resilient than envisaged in his analysis. Instead of "withering away" in the 1980s and 1990s, after the transition to capitalist agriculture, they seem to persist as strongly as ever. Thus, Foley (1991b) points to the increased importance of the land question in Mexico, despite the govermnent's attempts to substitute integrated rural development for land reform on the national political agenda. Over the past decade, land constituted one of the major demands of rural organizations not only in Mexico, but also in Brazil and Colombia - countries with no vestiges of sernifeudal agriculture.[5] Similarly, both Peru and Ecuador saw a proliferation of land conflicts after the abolition of semifeudal relations.[6] The persistence of land conflicts, in turn, raises questions about the presumably proletarian nature of peasant struggles. It is plausible that the structural trend towards depeasantization does not always destroy the peasant identity and replace it with proletarian consciousness, as envisaged by Paige (this point will be raised again later, in connection with the role of culture in peasant mobilization).

Land conflicts, it seems, are unlikely to disappear in the foreseeable future; and yet the longer they persist, the less likely it is that they will be resolved in an orderly, institutional fashion. To begin with, as has already been mentioned, since the transition to capitalist agriculture, the state has grown less willing to intervene on behalf of peasants. At the same time, the increased complexity of agrarian struggles, with land conflicts compounded by labour disputes and controversies about prices and credit, is likely to undermine the national unity of peasant movements that have organized around land struggles.[7] Moreover, the decades of state intervention took a toll on peasants' capacity for autonomous action, breeding clientelism and increasing state control over the beneficiaries of state policies. A pioneer study conducted by Powell (1970) in Venezuela after the land reform there revealed a tendency for the growth of clientelism in relations between the state and peasant organizations. This line of analysis is developed by Grindle (1986) and Galli (1981b), who see state intervention via land reform and integrated rural development as an instrument of social and political control. Ample evidence in support of this thesis is provided by the literature on Peru (with its vertical land reform) and Colombia (with an equally vertical IRD program).[8] One

should not, however, underestimate the peasant potential for autonomous political action. In fact, such action is frequently fuelled, rather than squashed, by state intervention. Peru's land reform, for instance, was questioned both by peasant communities excluded from the process of land redistribution and by peasant beneficiaries organized into peasant cooperatives. As for Columbia's IRD projects, Galli admits that

> social control could be jeopardized by the frustration of those peasants who desire to enter the program but cannot because their *veredas* are not considered potentially productive; such frustration combined with the disillusionment of those who leave the program because of tight control and of those who experience increasing dependency and/or impending bankruptcy could be welded into one and focused on the state (Galli 1981a, 88).

Overall, vertical land reforms and IRD projects can be considered effective instruments of social and political control only with regard to relatively small segments of rural populations, and only in the short run. Given the structural and fiscal constraints on the re-distributive capacity of Latin American states, successful interventions can hardly keep up with the expectation of immediate benefits those same states have created among the peasantry. The result may be the development of autonomous organizations on the margins of the state-sponsored network as well as a proliferation of conflicts between state-sponsored organizations and their supposed benefactors.

Both the struggle for further land redistribution and the questioning of state controls seem to be especially prominent in rural areas with a predominantly indigenous population. CONAIE in Ecuador, the Katarista movement in Bolivia, and the Regional Council of Cauca Indians (Consejo Regional Indigena del Cauca) in Colombia are some of the ethnic organizations that have been able to mobilize the indigenous peasantry under the banner of ethnicity. To these, we should add peasant organizations with a heavily indigenous base, such as the Mexican 'Plan de Ayala" National Coordinating Council (Coordinadora Nacional Plan Ayala, CNPA), and, in Peru, the National Agrarian Confederation (ConFederación Nacional Agraria, CNA) and the Andean departmental federations of the Campesino Confederation of Peru (ConFederación Campesina del Perú, CCP). The upsurge of ethnic militancy centred in rural areas raises questions about the relation between ethnic culture and peasant political mobilization.

Ethnic studies in Latin America stand in an uneasy relationship with agrarian or peasant studies in the region, most of which have been conducted with political economy and historical-structural perspectives. Following the tradition established by Wolf s and Stavenhagen's early writings on Indian corporate communities, it has frequently been assumed that the Indian identity will largely disappear in the process of the capitalist transformation of agriculture, as indigenous struggles are subsumed under class struggles.[9] Recent findings, however, make this assumption questionable. In indigenous ethnic areas, ethnic values can inform rural collective action, providing it with both culturally defined goals (the acquisition of land, for example) and institutional means (communal organization, for instance).[10]

Stem (1987) suggests that this fact is generally ignored by students of agrarian/peasant movements, who tend to reduce indigenous peasants to the role of 'parochial reactors," defending their subsistence in the face of capitalist expansion but lacking a broader cultural worldview. His otherwise compelling critique, however, has a somewhat indiscriminate character. Even though Stem mentions Wolf and Scott among the alleged offenders, his argument is consistent with their emphasis on the cultural and institutional conflicts triggered by the global expansion of the capitalist economy. Tlius, Wolf argues that "fflhe contact between the capitalist centre, the metropolis, and the pre-capitalist or non-capitalist periphery is a large-scale cultural encounter, not merely an economic one" (Wolf 1968, 278). It involves

> the world-wide spread and diffusion of a particular cultural

> system, that of North Atlantic capitalism. This cultural system - with its distinctive economics - . . . [is] profoundly alien to many of the areas which it engulfed in its spread. (Wolf 1968, 277)

Similarly, it follows from Scott's analysis that when peasants rebel against the growth of the market economy they are defending not only their physical subsistence but also the noncapitalist institutions of "moral economy," and that millennial ideologies with their strong ethnic underpinnings serve as a powerful point of reference in these rebellions (Scott 1976).

In fact, the "political economists" sharply criticized Scott and Wolf for their apparent disregard of the process of proletarianization among the Third World peasantry (Paige 1983; Brass 1990). However, as mentioned earlier, an increased reliance on wages does not necessarily result in the development of a proletarian consciousness. Rather, it may reinforce peasant values - not in a static, fossilized form, but, as Wolf aptly put it, as a blend of the old with the new (Wolf 1968). Wolf's vision of cultural continuity and change in peasant societies is quite similar to Stem's notion of resistance and adaptation, which holds that the indigenous population reconstructs its ethnic values and institutions in accordance with changing historical circumstances. Both ideas are exemplified by the evolution of the indigenous peasant community, which deserves our special attention here since it constitutes the main vehicle of rural political action in the Andean region.

Since Wolf published his influential study of closed corporate community (Wolf 1957), it has generally been agreed that the community as we know it now was imposed on the indigenous population as a result of the conquest and colonization. On the other hand, there is little doubt that this form of community incorporated many elements of the precolonial structures (ayllus in the Andes), with their emphasis on redistribution and reciprocity (Montoya 1989; Sánchez-Parga 1986). The end product proved agreeable first to the colonial administration and later to local power groups (represented by the 'unholy alliance' of landlord, priest, and government official) because it permitted them to extract economic surplus and labour from the indigenous peasantry. On the other hand, the community_provided individual peasant families, to use Pearse's expression, with a 'protective shell' in the face of a hostile and exploitive environment (Pearse 1975). In other words, the indigenous community served the interests of both the elites and the peasants. Who benefited more from its existence depended largely on the local and national correlation of forces.

The role of the indigenous community as a protector and representative of indigenous peasants increased as a result of the disintegration of the "unholy alliance" that had dominated the Andean countryside for the greater part of the twentieth century. In the 1960s and 1970s, the landlords lost much of their extra-economic power over peasants - and frequently much of their land, especially in areas affected by land reforms. Some of the government officials came under the influence of the reformist and developmentalist ideologies whose rise accompanied the implementation of land reform and IRD projects. As for the priests, influenced by the recommendations of Vatican H and the 1968 Conference of Latin American Bishops, *many* of them switched their support from the rich to the poor.[11]

The disintegration of the local power alliance was accompanied by an invasion of a multitude of new external actors -left-wing political parties and Protestant and other non-Catholic religious groups, in addition to national or international nongovernmental organizations involved in development programs. All of them courted the indigenous peasants, looking for their support and offering them economic benefits along with religious or political leadership. This change in local power relations had a profound effect on indigenous communal institutions. On the one hand, it resulted in the strengthening of indigenous communities. Not only were they liberated from the oppressive power of semifeudal landlords, but they also frequently found new allies and tapped new economic and political resources. On the other hand, the communal institutions experienced further modification, adapting themselves to new economic and political realities and incorporating new (progressive Catholic, Protestant, reformist, or socialist) cultural elements. Not always easily

reconcilable with more traditional communal values and norms, these cultural supplements gave the indigenous peasant communities an unprecedented political dynamism. It is my contention that in the case of Ecuador, these developments, combined with the limited and vertical nature of the land reform and IRD projects, gave rise to a strong and politically autonomous movement of indigenous peasant communities, a movement that was able to focus agrarian struggles on the land question in an attempt to reverse the structural trend towards depeasantization. It was also able to combine the land struggle with a quest for communal control of rural development, building on the indigenous claim, sustained and thwarted through history, to communal decision-making autonomy and control of local resources.

This paper will focus on land conflicts, conflicts over rural development, and the growth of *communal* organization. Geographically, the focus will be on the province of Chimborazo. Chimborazo was selected for a number of reasons. First, it is one of the country's three provinces with the highest levels of state intervention via land reform.[12] Second, it has the largest number of indigenous peasant communities in the country.[13] Finally, Chimborazo has a long tradition of Indian and peasant struggles, and was one of the two focal points of the 1990 uprising.[14]

Economic Defeat, Political Victory:
The 1964 Land Reform and the Growth of Community Organization in Chimborazo

Chimborazo is one of Ecuador's provinces with strong indigenous and hacienda traditions. At the same time, it is characterized by pronounced regional disparities - disparities that have given rise to a diversity of political forms in the province's northern, central, and southern regions.

Before the Spanish conquest, the territory that is now Chimborazo was part of the Puruha kingdom, which was ruled by the Duchicelas of Cacha. Through marriages, the Duchicelas formed political alliances with the powerful pre-Columbian conquerors of the region: the Shyris of Quito and the Incas of Cuzco. This strategy did not work with the Spaniards. Despite a series of bloody uprisings, the Puruhas lost their political power and most of their land.

The effect of the Spanish conquest was especially devastating in the northern region (the present-day cantons of Guano, Chambo, Penipe, and Riobamba - in which the provincial capital of the same name is found). The lower altitudes (between three thousand and thirty-five hundred metres above sea level) enjoy a relatively mild climate and an abundance of water that can be used for irrigation. These attributes led to an early growth of the commercial hacienda in this area, accompanied by the expulsion of Indians from their lands and the widespread use of forced or draft labour (mita) by the hacienda owners. So feared was the mita that many Indians abandoned their communities and fled to the coast or the Amazon, or moved to local haciendas or urban centres, where they were exempt from the draft (Moreno Yáñez 1985, 44-45). The advance of the Spaniards and their cultural heirs, the mestizos, was fiercely resisted by the indigenous population. Most of Chimborazo's indigenous rebellions during the colonial period (five out of a total of eight) took place in the northern region (Tincui-CONAIE 1989, 173). In 1871, the northern region also became the site of one of the largest Indian rebellions in Ecuador's history. This uprising was led by Daquilema, who was honoured by his followers as the king of Cacha. The defeat of the Indian insurgents and the disintegration of a large number of indigenous communities were followed by an influx of urban mestizos into the rural areas, accompanied by the process of acculturation among the remaining Indian population. This accounts for the high proportion of mestizo communities and mestizo individual farmers around Riobamba.

Colonial experiences were different in the central and southern regions, which Burgos's classic study described as Chimborazo's "indigenous" area.[15] The central region, including the cantons of Colta and Guarnote, is characterized by the predominance of highland plateaus (between thirty-five hundred and four thousand metres above sea level). The indigenous community_here lost virtually all their land and were turned into captive communities on the haciendas. By contrast, in the southern region

(including the cantons of Alausí and Chunchi), the development of the hacienda was limited by unfavourable topographic conditions. In addition, the indigenous communities in this area fiercely resisted the Spaniards' attempts to appropriate their land. Eventually, the hacienda system penetrated this region, too. Nevertheless, it failed to eliminate independent freehold communities, which retained considerable institutional autonomy with regard to the haciendas and mestizo society at large. The expansion of Spanish/mestizo domination in the central and southern regions was accompanied by Indian rebellions, even though according to historical reports, here they were not as numerous as in the North of the province (Moreno Yáñez, 1985).

These differences notwithstanding, the hacienda came to constitute the backbone of the postcolonial order in rural Chimborazo. Geared towards commercial food production, the system was based on relations of huasipungo - an Ecuadorian version of service-tenure. The huasipunguero and his family had to work for the hacendado; in exchange, they had access to a subsistence plot and the pastures (generally in the paramos, the zone above the tree line), woods, and other resources within the hacienda boundaries. Huasipungo was complemented by another form of service-tenure - yanapa, - whereby the freehold communities offered occasional "help" to the hacendados in exchange for access to the hacienda pastures and woods.[16]

The hacienda order started to crack in the 1940s and 1950s. The export expansion on the coast, triggered by the post-World War Il economic boom, increased the scope of peasant migrations and eroded the power base of the Andean landlords. At the same time, the growth of the urban demand for food spurred the capitalist transformation of the Andean hacienda. Combined with the fragmentation of land estates by inheritance and the growing number of land sales, this process undermined the hacienda order based on huasipungo in many parts of the northern region. The hacienda order, however, was still remarkably strong in the central and some parts of the southern region. In these two regions, the hacienda system was most seriously challenged by the huasipungueros, who found their political ally in Ecuador's Communist Party.

In 1944, the Communist Party created the Ecuadorian Indian Federation (Federación Ecuatoriana de Indios, FEI) with the objective of incorporating Indian peasants into the struggle for socialism. This was, however, a long-term objective. FEI's immediate goals were the replacement of huasipungo by wage relations and the transformation of the supposedly disunited and submissive Indian peasantry into a militant agricultural proletariat organized in rural unions. With these objectives in mind, FEI leaders encouraged the organization of hacienda unions, which became involved in a struggle for minimum wages and fringe benefits (vacation pay, for example) in fulfillment of existing labour legislation. These struggles, which reached their peak in the early 1960s, resulted in a wave of strikes and land seizures, which were especially strong among the Indian huasipungueros: of the central region.

Even though the formal huasipunguero demands focused primarily on wages, what was actually at stake was the hacienda land. According to Sylva (1986), in many cases the landlords were unable to pay wages to peasants because of the low productivity of their haciendas, and the peasants were not really interested in wages. What they wanted was land. To some extent, the huasipungueros' concern with land reflected the fact that even though many received part of their family income in wages, they continued to identify themselves as peasants whose subsistence depended on access to land. In this sense, the huasipunguero struggle against the hacendados could be considered a peasant struggle, despite its proclaimed proletarian goals. In another sense, however, it could also be considered an ethnic struggle - a continuation of the Indian rebellions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, with the geographical centre of Indian resistance shifting to the haciendas of the central region. It is plausible that the struggle against huasipungo had a cultural as well as economic dimension, that it was a struggle against the mestizo domination embodied in the hacienda order.

The huasipungueros largely lost their economic struggle. Despite the FEI-led peasant

mobilization, it was still the landlords who had the upper hand when land reform was implemented. One result was that, economically speaking, peasants got the short end of the stick. The 1964 agrarian reform legislation abolished the relations of huasipungo and granted huasipungueros property rights over their small plots of land. The actual transfer of land by the government to the peasants, though, was insignificant (see Table 1). In the ten years following the 1964 reform, approximately twenty-two thousand hectares of land (3.4 percent of the province's land) was transferred to peasants, most of it in the central region.[17] At the same time, peasants lost access to the hacienda pastures and other resources (wood, water, and so on) to which they had been entitled as huasipungueros. To regain this access they still had to work for the landlord for minimal wages or for none; huasipungo was replaced by yanapa.

The only place the 1964 land reform had a lasting effect in terms of land redistribution was the canton of Colta, in the central region. In the nineteenth century, many of its large estates had been owned by the Catholic Church. After the turn of the century, they were transformed into public property. Most of these public estates were transferred to peasants as a result of the 1964 reform.[18] This accounts, to a large extent, for the relative weakness of land struggles in this canton in subsequent decades.

TABLE 1 LAND TRANSFERRED BY IERAC BY YEARS AND REGIONS,* CHIMBORAZO, 1964-91
(IN HECTARES)

YEAR	NORTHERN	CENTRAL	SOUTHERN	PROVINCE
1964	238	150	186	574
1965	696	4,481	1,081	6,258
1966	40	1,891	730	2,661
1967	20	755	194	969
1968		1,558	314	1,872
1969		2,419	4,647	7,066
1970		10	112	122
1971		763	131	894
1972	1	3	16	20
1973		345	8	353
1974		820		820
1972	7,365	3,559	339	11,263
1976	1,923	23,409	509	25,841
1977	473	2,449	4,808	7,730
1978	222	440		662
1979	2,585	12,259	1,022	15,863
1980	56	1,827		1,883
1981	1	2,173	772	2,946
1982	15	2,300		2,315
1983	71	7,839	52	7,962
1984	88	962	4,309	5,359
1985	34	4,694	245	4,973
1986	121	3,002	396	3,519
1987		26	1	27
1988	1	27	310	338
1989	2	472	357	831
1990		1,221	1,221	
1991**		576	13	589
Total transfers	**13,949**	**80,430**	**20,552**	**114,931**
Total land198,700	233,100	215,300	647,100	
% of transfers	**7**	**34**	**10**	**18**

Northern region includes cantons Riobamba, Guano, Penipe, and Chambo; central region includes cantons Colta, Guamote, and Pallatanga; southern region includes cantons Alausí and Chunchi.

* * January-August.

Sources: Data on land transfers come from the archives of IERAC, Ministry of Agriculture, Quito; data on regional and provincial land are cited in Banco Central del Ecuador (1988: 90).

While for the majority of the indigenous peasantry the 1964 land reform was an economic defeat, it was a clear victory in political and institutional terms. The collapse of the hacienda order was followed by a rapid growth of community organizations, which in the 1970s and 1980s became a powerful force in the local and national political arena.[19] Since 1964, an increasing number of communities had have been availing themselves of the 1937 Law of Communes (Ley de Comunas) - something that huasipunguero communities were not able to do. The law granted the registered communities official status as "communes," which legally sanctioned communities' control over their resources and promised state support for communal development. It also established community councils (cabildos) as a maximum authority within the community. The cabildos had to be elected every year by the community general assembly and ratified by the Ministry of Social Welfare (later by the Ministry of Agriculture).

In the decade following the 1964 reform, over 150 communities obtained commune status approximately the same number as were granted that status in the twenty-seven years preceding the land reform (Table 2). In 1991 the number of officially recognized communities in the province reached 514. The largest number of legally recognized communities, not only in absolute terms but also in relation to the rural population, was reported in the central region, where most of the huasipunguero struggles had been taking place. In effect, many of the new communes were former huasipunguero communities. To the legally recognized communities we should add over 300 unrecognized communities (Ecofuturo 1990, 91). This gives us a total of over 800 communities - an impressive figure, especially if compared to the number of other peasant organizations: 83 agricultural associations (generally formed when a community could not achieve legal recognition as a commune because of the limited size of its membership) and 82 agricultural cooperatives (organized by the Ministry of Agriculture during the land reform, generally on the basis of existing communities).[20]

TABLE 2 **NUMBER OF OFFICIALLY RECOGNIZED COMMUNITIES BY YEARS AND REGIONS, CHIMBORAZO, 1937-91**

YEAR	NORTHERN	CENTRAL	SOUTHERN	PROVINCE
1937-63	73	54	29	156
1964	9	3	1	13
1965	2	14	2	18
1966	2	3		5
1967	3	4		7
1968	2	10	2	14
1969	8	9	10	27
1970	4	11	2	17
1971	3	5		8
1972	4	10	3	17
1973	13	9		22
1974		2	1	3
1975	1	4		5
1976	4	10	1	15
1977	1	4	1	6
1978		7		7
1979		6		6
1980		16	1	17
1981	1	17		18
1982	4	10	1	15
1983	10	3	1	14
1984	5	4	5	14
1985	12	7		19
1986	6	2		8
1987	1			1
1988	2	3		5
1989	3	5	2	10
1990	11	3	6	20
1991*		14	3	825
Total Communities	200	238	76	514
Total population in rural areas	285,418	81,565	50,802	417,785
No. of communities per 1,000 people in rural areas	0.7	2.9	1.4	1.2

*January- August.
Sources: Data on the number of communities come from the archives of the Division of Peasant Education and Rural Development, Ministry of Agriculture, Quito; data on population come from V Censo de Poblaci6n Y Vivienda (19 91: 9-10).

To some extent, this organizational explosion demonstrated the extraordinary vitality of the indigenous communal tradition, rooted in the pre-colonial past and in the colonial and hacienda experiences. While a discussion of all the intricacies of indigenous communal institutions goes beyond the scope of this paper, three institutional elements should be mentioned in connection with our analysis: access to land, communal work, and communal decision making.[21]

Communal landownership in Chimborazo lost its significance a long time ago: most of the former communal lands had been appropriated by

the haciendas and much of the land stilled owned by the communities were subdivided into family plots. The most typical pattern of land tenure in Chimborazo prior to the 1964 reform was a combination of family holdings (either rented from the hacienda or family-owned) and communal pastures (owned by either the hacienda or the community). Land transfers after the reform reinforced this trend. Even though the Ecuadorian Institute for Agrarian Reform and Colonization (Instituto Ecuatoriano de Reforma Agraria y Colonizacion, IERAQ generally insisted that communal property form part of the reformed areas, most agricultural lands were subsequently subdivided into family plots. A mixed (family and community) pattern of land tenure in indigenous communities coexisted with a strong attachment to land among their members. This attachment, along with ethnic discrimination and high rates of un- or underemployment in Ecuador's urban sector and coastal plantation areas, accounts for the reluctance of indigenous peasants to migrate to the cities or the coast. There is thus a particular poignancy to their struggle for land. Access to land in this cultural and economic context was seen by community members as a highly desirable alternative to migration.

While the communal control of land was of relatively minor significance in the everyday operation of indigenous peasant communities, labour exchange constituted one of the most visible manifestations of the persistence of indigenous communal tradition. Labour exchange was not only frequent between individual families (randipaj); it was also practiced as collective or communal work (minga). Prior to the elimination of huasipungo, mingas had frequently been used by the hacienda owners and members of local power groups for their private advantage. Within the indigenous community, however, they were considered a way of meeting community needs for labour during the harvest season or more frequently for the construction and maintenance of communal infrastructure: local roads, ditches, bridges, community centres, schools, and chapels. It should be emphasized that while relatively few indigenous communities in Chimborazo) had communal land, most of them owned some elements of physical infrastructure run by the communal authorities. This explains not only their recent interest in rural development projects, but also their attempts to put those projects under community control.

Decisions regarding the mingas and communal infi-astructure were generally made by communal authorities within the context of local power relations. Historically, extracommunal actors had a considerable influence over communal decisions, especially on the haciendas, where traditional authorities (regidores or caciques) were often appointed by the hacendado and/or local government officials. The decline of the hacienda order, however, increased the decisional autonomy of communal authorities. Formed by general assemblies and elected cabildos, they exercised their decision-making power not only with regard to mingas and infrastructure, but also in the areas of intracommunal relations and the relations between communities and external actors. Communal authorities settled minor conflicts between community members and between these and outsiders, in some cases performing the functions traditionally executed by local government officials (tenientes politicos). They also mediated and supervised community relations with a host of external actors, from local landowners to national and foreign development agencies. While still operating within the national and local context, characterized by a highly skewed distribution of power, the postreform communal authorities were much better equipped for defending the interests of their communities than their hacienda predecessors had been.

The importance of traditional (precolonial, colonial, or hacienda) values and institutions in the postreform community movement should not be overestimated. It was a renewed tradition - a tradition reinforced by political expediency and blending old social patterns with new influences and aspirations. These influences and aspirations were reflected in the rise of new indigenous leaders - people with a secondary or higher education and a good understanding of national politics. Sharing their authority with traditional community leaders - whose authority was rooted in kinship relations, religious practices, and control of the local economy - these new leaders increasingly replaced urban mestizos as intermediaries between the communities and the national political system. It was also this younger generation of leaders that

played an important role in the formation of intercommunal federations such as Jatun Ayllu in Guamote, Inca Atahualpa in Alausí, or Cacha's Federation of Indigenous Councils (Federación de Cabildos Indigenas de Cacha) in Riobamba. In the early 1990s, Chimborazo had 27 local intercommunal organizations (Carrasco, forthcoming) and four provincial federations: the Indigenous Movement of Chimborazo (Movimiento Indfgena de Chimborazo, MICH) and the Chimborazo Federation of Indigenous Organizations (Federación de Organizaciones Indigenas de Chimborazo, FOICH), both affiliated with CONAIE; the Indigenous Evangelicals' Association of Chimborazo (Asociaci6n de Indigenas Evangélicos de Chimborazo, AIECH); and the Peasant Union of Ecuador (Uni6n Campesina del Ecuador, UCAE) influenced by the political left.

The younger generation of community leaders was more willing than its predecessors had been to look for external allies who could offer legal, economic, or political support to their communities. In effect, the 1964 land reform was accompanied by massive shifts in local power alliances. The 'unholy alliance" that had dominated the Andean countryside for more than a century was gradually falling apart. While the hacienda owners had lost much of their extraeconomic power after the suppression of huasipungo, some local government officials became, willy-nilly, involved in the implementation of land reform. As for the Catholic priests, many of them had "deserted" their former allies altogether. Under the leadership of Monsignor Proafto, archbishop of Riobamba, the "progressive" Catholic clergy had turned against the landowning mestizo elites to side with the indigenous peasantry.[22]

The evolution of Chimborazo's Catholic church is of particular interest. Originally conservative and paternalist, it gave rise to a dynamic "progressive* sector whose members played a crucial role in the formation of Chimborazo's indigenous community movement. The church's ties with the landowners began to weaken in the 1950s, when the church became involved in rural social programs in collaboration with the Ecuadorian division of the UN Andean Mission (Misión Andina del Ecuador, MAE). These programs were designed to improve the social and economic conditions of the indigenous peasantry through the organization of peasant cooperatives and health and literacy campaigns. The programs were subsequently criticized for having a bureaucratic and ethnocentric bias that caused some indigenous communities to view them with mistrust. Despite this problem, the work with MAE did gain the Catholic church some friends in the indigenous communities - and numerous enemies among the mestizo landowners.[23]

The Catholic church's commitment to indigenous peasants increased after the 1968 Medellin Conference of Latin American Bishops. Chimborazo's progressive clergy proclaimed its *preferential option for the poor," while at the same time becoming increasingly involved in a reappraisal and development of indigenous culture (Proafio 1980). Most importantly, it organized the People's Radiophonic School (Escuelas Radiof6nicas Populares), which transmitted daily programs on basic literacy, arithmetic, agricultural techniques, hygiene and health, and so on, along with local news and evangelical messages. The programs were transmitted in Quichua and Spanish - a bold initiative in the context of the region's long-standing white-mestizo supremacy culture (Informe de la Di6cesis de Riobamba, 1984). At the same time, the progressive Catholic clergy increasingly came to realize the importance of land reform and the need for organization among the indigenous peasantry. It provided indigenous peasants with legal advice in their struggles against the hacienda owners and helped them to achieve official recognition of their communities after the suppression of huasipungo. Chimborazo's progressive church also supported the organization of provincial and regional indigenous federations - MICH and the Awakening of the Ecuadorian Indian (Ecuador Runacunapac Riccharimui, ECUARUNARI) - representing Indian communities of the country's Andean provinces. Along with CONFENIAE, a federation of Amazonian Indians, ECUARUNARI formed CONAIE - the national representative of Ecuador's indigenous people.

These developments underscore the importance of Chimborazo's Catholic church as a catalyst in the process of indigenous peasant organization. By the late 1970s, the progressive clergy had largely replaced the Communist Party as

the main ally of the indigenous peasantry. Santana (1983, 160-64) explains the decline in the communist4ed FEI largely in terms of its fragile organization at the local level. Apparently, the FEI leadership underestimated the organizational potential of indigenous communities, giving preference to the organization of rural unions and agricultural production cooperatives whose political objectives and relation to the community were not always sufficiently clear to community members.

By contrast, the progressive church gave its wholehearted support to community organization, and was willing to accommodate Christian and indigenous values and institutions. This flexibility, combined with its preferential option for the poor, accounts the remarkable influence of the progressive church within Chimborazo's community movement. Considerable as it was, the presence of the Catholic church did not remain unchallenged. In Colta and in various parts of cantons Riobamba. and Guamote, the Catholic influence was questioned by Protestant missionaries who arrived in Chimborazo at approximately the same time as the Andean Mission and who created a federation of indigenous protestant churches: AIECH. Like many Catholic priests, the Protestant missionaries became heavily involved in social work with indigenous peasant communities, organizing cooperatives and building schools and health centres. The Protestants, however, put more emphasis on individual or family economic achievement than the Catholics. Moreover, in their attempts to promote savings and eliminate alcoholism, they banned communal religious festivals, which they associated with drinking and unproductive spending. Finally, they downplayed the importance of indigenous struggles for land, insisting that thrift and hard work were the only legitimate way to prosperity.

The Protestant missionaries' teachings, however, were considerably modified by their indigenous followers. In their evangelical zeal, the Protestants had translated the New Testament into Quichua and promoted it as a means of religious communication. Moreover, they had incorporated Indian believers into the clergy, something the Catholic church always refused - and still refuses - to do. Many of the indigenous pastors tried to reconcile the religious ideas brought to them by the missionaries with their own communal experiences and values. As a result, in some areas (Cacha, for instance), the indigenous Protestant clergy played an important role in the development of local communal organizations, concentrating mostly on community development projects.

Generally speaking, Protestant communities tend to be less involved in land conflicts than the communities influenced by the progressive Catholic church. To some extent, this may reflect the aversion of the Protestant missionaries and their followers to political struggles. However, in some areas, such as Colta, the low intensity of land confllicts can be better understood in structural socio-economic terms. As already mentioned, Colta is the only canton in Chimborazo that saw a massive transfer of public estates to peasants as a result of the 1964 reform. Subsequently, land conflicts in Colta developed mostly between various segments of the peasantry and/or urban dwellers, all eager to get hold of the former public lands - rather than between peasants and the powerful landlords, as was the case of the rest of the province. The weakness of the landowning class in Colta, combined with the Protestants' efforts to promote accumulation among peasant families contributed to the rise of a prosperous segment of indigenous peasants and traders. While Muratorio (1980) did not detect any traces of indigenous peasant capitalism in Colta in the 1970s, Santana, writing ten years later, talks about the rise of a small indigenous bourgeoisie involved in local trade and linked to AEECH.[24] This situation, along with the more individualistic worldview of the Protestant leaders, accounted for the relatively conservative political orientation of AIECH, which contrasted with the more militant stand of the indigenous federations influenced by the progressive Catholic church.

In the 1960s and 1970s, religious and political differences created numerous tensions between the Catholic and Protestant indigenous organizations. More recently, however, this bad feeling has given way to a spirit of cooperation, which is especially strong at the local level. Thus, in Cacha, Catholic and Protestant community leaders are working together within the same local federation. Moreover, many Protestant communities took part in the 1990 indigenous

uprising, despite strong criticism from the AIECH provincial leadership.

The political heterogeneity of Chimborazo's peasantry increased even further as a result of the growing influence of the new political left. Most influential was the Popular Democratic Movement (Movimiento Democritico Popular, MPD), a broad-based electoral party which grew out of a Maoist splinter from the proMoscow Communist Party. In the countryside, the MPD had support in the predominantly mestizo communities near Riobamba, (Quimiag, for example) and in some of the indigenous areas of Guamote and Palmira, in the central region. Along with their Catholic and Protestant counterparts, the communities influenced by the MPD took part in the 1990 uprising, even though the MPD national leadership did not support this initiative.

The decline of the FEI, the subsequent rise of the Church-supported indigenous organizations, the uneasy relations between Catholics and Protestants, and the presence of the new political left in mestizo and indigenous communities -all point to the complexities of Andean politics, where ethnicity, class, political ideology, and religion intertwine, producing political outcomes not easily understood when any one of these factors is considered in isolation from the others. The common denominator in this increasingly complex political game was, however, the growing strength of the community movement in both indigenous and mestizo areas. The 1964 land reform is generally viewed as a defeat for the Andean peasantry, because it failed to impose its political will on the government and consequently had to put up with a highly limited form of land redistribution.[25] This view has to be qualified in the fight of later events. Tie communities lost the game in terms of access to economic resources. But they won an impressive victory in political and institutional terms. The 1964 reform was followed by an opening of the local political arena and the growth of a province-wide community movement. These contradictory outcomes set the scene for the land struggles of the following decades.

The Land Reform Is Dead!
Long Live the Land Reform!

The decline of the hacienda order in Chimborazo coincided with an increase in state economic intervention. The 1964 land reform legislation was accompanied by the creation of IERAC - still another actor on the increasingly crowded rural political arena.

Initially, IERAC had a relatively low profile, dedicating itself mostly to colonization projects in the Amazon. In many cases, the suppression of huasipungo on Andean haciendas was conducted privately by the hacendados, without any intervention by IERAC officials. This situation changed under the reformist government of General Rodriguez Lam (1972-76) and his military successors (1976-1979). Their terms coincided with the period of national economic boom triggered by the discovery of oil in the Amazon. Influenced by ECLA's developmentalist ideology, Rodriguez Lam used the oil-augmented state revenues to give a new impetus to the program of land redistribution and rural/agricultural development.

Lara's 1973 land reform legislation was designed to take the capitalist modernization of agriculture a step further, eliminating all economically inefficient estates.[26] Articles 24 and 25 of the new law pointed to economic inefficiency in the hacienda sector as a major reason for state intervention. By law, hacienda owners had to have at least 80 percent of their land utilized in accordance with *the technical* standards of the area; underutilized areas were subject to confiscation by IERAC. In this sense, the 1973 reform was consistent with previous legislation designed to encourage the capitalist modernization of the hacienda sector. In another sense, however, it opened new avenues for state intervention, creating a legal foundation for a much more radical approach. According to Article 30, Section 9, the state could confiscate property in areas of high demographic pressure, regardless of its economic efficiency. High demographic pressure, according to the law, existed in areas where peasants were unable to meet their subsistence needs because of the inadequate size of their family holdings - a common situation in those rural areas of Chimborazo that had not been changed by the 1964 land reform. This article, however, was seldom applied by IERAC. Targeted at economically

efficient capitalist farms, it went against the modernizing "productivist" spirit of the land reform. As such, it was opposed not only by landowners but also by many government officiak who feared that the application of this clause would disrupt the flow of commercial surplus.[27]

Despite the limited application of the 1973 legislation, Chimborazo is generally cited as one of the three provinces with the highest rates of land redistribution (IERAC 1989; Zevallos 1990, 45; Chiriboga 1988, 45). The economic inefficiency clause was frequently used here in combination with a provision that permitted the expropriation of high-altitude (paramo) pastures, the control of which allowed their owners to extract unpaid labour from local peasants. The laws prohibiting yanapa and sharecropping were also now enforced with greater consistency. According to the Central Bank, between 1964 and 1988 IERAC redistributed 19.3 percent of the total amount of land in the province -more than twice the national average of 9 percent (Banco Centro del Ecuador, 1988, 92).[28] Land transfers were especially sweeping in the central region, where huge haciendas spread into the paramos zone and nonwage relations were still common practice. In Guamote, for example, more than half the cantonal land was seized by IERAC (see Table 1).

What sometimes passes unnoticed though (see, for example, Chiriboga 1988, 45) is that while the national data generally refer to the amount of farmland, the provincial figures for Chimborazo refer to the total amount of land in the province. Less than half of the provincial land, however, falls into the category of farmland; most of it is unsuitable for either agricultural or pastoral activities (Banco Central del Ecuador, 1988, 89). Unfortunately, there are no official figures on the proportion of Chimborazo's farmland that was affected by the land reform. According to an unofficial 1989 survey, however, only 20.1 percent of the land that was transferred can be considered farmland, with 2.8 percent of it being suitable for agricultural purposes, and 17.3 percent for pasture. Ile remaining 79.9 percent was unproductive land and slopes covered with forests, unsuitable for either agriculture or livestock production.[29] Part of these currently unproductive lands had probably been marginal low-productivity farmland at the time of the transfer and was depleted later as a result of the demographic pressure on land in the peasant sector. It is plausible, though, that much of it had been unproductive even before the transfer. One way or another, it is clear that the 1973 reform had considerably increased peasants' control over the geographic territory, but hardly improved their access to farmland. If the unofficial estimates are correct, then in 1990 the reform sector accounted for only 8 percent of the province's farmland - a lower figure than the admittedly low national average. [30]

The futility of the land redistribution efforts is especially stunning in light of the province's demographic trends. Whatever gains accrued to the peasantry as a result of the 1973 land reform were cancelled out by the continuing growth of the rural population. According to data from the National Institute of Statistics and Census, the rural population in Chimborazo grew from 219,000 in 1962 to 243,000 in 1990 (Ecofuturo 1990, Tables 5 and 9; V Censo de Poblaci6n y IV de Vivienda, 1991, 9-10). If we compare estimates of the transfers of farmland between 1964 and 1989 with estimates of rural demographic growth over roughly the same period (1962-90), we find that for each 'added" person in Chimborazo's countryside, IERAC transferred 0.1 hectare of agricultural land, 0.6 hectare of natural pastures, and 2.4 hectares of unproductive lands and woods. The result was an absence of fundamental change in the situation of Chimborazo's smallholders (see Table 3). In the late 1980s, over 80 percent of *the province's* landholdings were in parcels of less than 5 hectares, and still amounted to only 15 percent of the total land area. More than half the land continued to be held in large production units.

TABLE 3
LAND DISTRIBUTION BY SIZE OF HOLDINGS, CHIMBORAZO, 1954-1989

SIZE	(IN HAS.) 1954 PERCENTAGE OF HOLDING HAS. S.		1974 PERCENTAGE OF HOLDING HAS S.		1989 PERCENTAGE OF HOLDING HAS. S.	
< 1	26.1	1.5	29.8	1.5	30.9	1.9
1-5	60.9	15.8	52.7	13.8	52.4	13.4
5-20	9.6	9.9	14.7	15.5	14.1	17.7
1	2.4	11.6	2.0	8.7	7.2	11.7
> 100	1.0	61.1	0.7	60.6	0.7	55.8

Sources: the 1954, 1974 Agricultural Censuses and the 1989 estimates of Chimborazo's Ministry of Agriculture cited in Ecofuturo, 1990: 70.

The most notable consequence of the 1973 reform was a sharp increase in the number of holdings between 20 and 100 hectares. Between 1974 and 1989, properties in this size range almost tripled as a proportion of total properties. Many of these medium-sized properties were capitalist farms formed after the break-up and sale of haciendas. It was these farms, along with the remaining large estates, that championed the process of capitalist restructuring in Chimborazo, switching from traditional food crops (wheat, barley, potatoes) to livestock production (beef and dairy products). Between 1954 and 1987, the area of artificial pastures in Chimborazo increased almost four times - from 13,800 hectares to 49,500 hectares.[31] In addition, many improvements (installation of irrigation systems, and so on) were made to natural pastures, but these are not reflected in the statistics.

The conversion from food to livestock production in Chimborazo obeyed a political as well as an economic logic. Ile growth of Guayaquil and Riobamba over the previous decades had increased the urban demand for dairy products and beef. Further, the frequent allegations by local peasants of the persistence of nonwage labour relations and economic inefficiency made the hacienda owners look for ways of increasing their agricultural productivity (or at least creating an impression of such an increase in the eyes of IERAC officials[32]) while at the same time diminishing their dependence on local labour. Livestock production suited both purposes admirably, and this is why in the wake of the land reform this branch of agriculture was increasingly practised by medium- and large-size farmers.

The expansion of dairy farming in the Ecuadorian Andes is sometimes associated with the technological modernization of agriculture (Barsky and Cosse 1981). The expansion of livestock production in Chimborazo, however, could be better understood as capitalist restructuring with a minimum of technological modernization. To be sure, it involved a capitalist reorganization of labour relations and capital investment in livestock, pasture management, and infrastructure (stables, fencing, and so on). Given the generally low natural endowment of the province, however, this investment was kept to a minimum, as manifested in the low levels of productivity in Chimborazo's dairy sector. According to the Ministry of Agriculture, in 1989 the so-called "traditional" and "semitraditional" dairy farms, (with an average daily productivity of 3 and 5.5 litres of milk per cow, respectively) dominated the province's dairy farming in terms of both the number of cows and the amount of milk produced. The *modem* farms, with a daily productivity of 8 litres per cow, accounted for only 10 percent of the province's milk cattle and 20 percent of its milk production (Ecofuturo 1990, 85). In other words, instead of embarking on a full-fledged process of capitalist modernization, Chimborazo's large and medium farmers switched from traditional food production to traditional and semitraditional dairy farming. While productivity gains in this case were likely to

be minimal, the impact on rural employment was devastating: livestock production requires considerably less manual labour than food crops do.[33] That most dairy farms and cattle ranches were in areas of high demographic pressure aggravated the problem. A case typical of the situation was that of Guayllabamba, a former hacienda in the northern region of the province that was converted into a "semitraditional' dairy farm and cattle ranch. The property consisted of 680 hectares of irrigated land and almost 4,000 hectares of unirrigated pastures, but it employed only fifty-three permanent workers. Meanwhile, Guayllabamba bordered with two virtually landless communities (San Antonio de Guayllabainba and San Francisco de Guayllabamba) with a combined population of about 350 families, most of whom depended on income earned outside the area.

A contrasting pattern of agricultural modernization could be seen in some of the smallholding areas near Riobamba -the communities around Quimiag, for example - that had specialized in the production of vegetables and com (highly labour-intensive activities, compared to dairy farming and cattle ranching). In this area, land reform affected the high-quality farmland rather than the marginally productive or unproductive lands. The result was the appearance of prosperous small farmers growing com, potatoes, and vegetables, in addition to raising livestock on a small scale. Operating within the community framework, they relied on a combination of family and wage labour. The proportion of wage labourers as compared to family workers, however, was relatively small. According to a CARE survey, only 30 percent of Quimiag families reported income from wages. Moreover, more than one-third of the wage eamers worked locally, mostly within the communities, which had become the single largest employer in the area (Waters 1988, Tables 6 and 7).

Unfortunately for Chimborazos' peasants, the relatively fertile land and favourable employment situation in Quimiag was fairly atypical of the province. Most of the commercial development in Chimborazo took place on large- and medium-sized farms whose owners were more inclined to breed cattle than grow com or vegetables. Combined with the limited scope of land redistribution, this trend resulted in the increasing importance of seasonal migrations as a source of family income. According to a survey conducted by the IRD project in Guamote (in the central region), virtually all peasant families in the canton had at least one member (usually the head of the family) working outside the parish where they lived.[34] In 73 percent of the cases, this involved moving to Quito, Guayaquil, or areas of labour-intensive capitalist agriculture around these two urban centres for a period of less than four months. Most of the migrants worked as unskilled labourers in construction projects, markets, and dockyards; as harvest hands working on coastal sugar cane, coffee, and cocoa plantations; or as help on com-growing estates near Quito (Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganaderfa, 1983).

A similar situation was reported by Martfnez (1985), Carrasco (1990), and Lentz (forthcoming) in the case of indigenous peasant communiti in Colta (also in the central region). In addition, in areas close to Riobamba a large number of community members were occupied in the urban informal sector. In Cacha communities, located on the dry and eroded hills over Riobamba, there was virtually no agriculture, with the exception of the occasional kitchen garden. The overwhelming majority of the male members of these communiti (and a growing number of female) earned their income in Riobamba. Most worked as wage labourers or street vendors; a privileged few owned small stores or were involved in interprovincial trade. This situation is a far cry from what is usually meant by "peasant community. " However, relatively few areas in Chimborazo had reached the level of depeasantization reported in Cacha; most were still anchored in family agriculture to some degree. Nevertheless, more and more communities looked like "migrant communities' - a term Lenz uses to refer to communities whose members derive most of their income from migration.

It should be emphasized, however, that even though migrant community may accurately describe the objective economic condition of many indigenous communities in Chimborazo, it does not necessarily reflect their members' self-perception. Stubbornly, many of them continued to identify themselves as agricultores or agricultural producers (which, given their low level of capitalization, means peasant producers), even when the size of

their family plot constituted a small fraction of a hectare and most of their income came from migrations. This incongruence is apparent, for example, in a survey done in the community of CastugTungurahilla in Colta. Although 84 percent of the interviewed community's members reported owning less than one hectare of land, and 80 percent of its respondents admitted that family agriculture covers their subsistence needs for less than six months of the year, 87 percent of the respondents also said that their main occupation was family agriculture (Martfnez 1985, Tables 3 and 17). Even in Cacha, where the process of depeasantization was virtually complete, between twenty and thirty male respondents in each of three of the seventeen local communities identified themselves as peasants.[35]

The incongruity between the objective condition of community members and their self-identification may have several explanations. Some (probably very few) might have actually purchased land outside their communities (this is true of some of the relatively prosperous traders in Cacha). Others might have been using this self-identification as a device intended to lure the Ministry of Agriculture into supporting whatever farming activities still existed in the area. Many others, however, were probably calling themselves agricultores simply because they did not want to give up their peasant identity - or rather because their wanderings in search of income could not provide them with an alternative identity.

The persistence of peasant identity is closely related to the adoption of a repeasantization strategy by many of Chimborazo's migrants. Carrasco's study of urban migrants from the community of Puesetus indicates that only those who had been able to find a stable, relatively well paid job (approximately one-tenth of the respondents) opted for permanent urban residence. The remaining nine tenths, unskilled labourers and street vendors for the most part, still had their life projects tied to land. By reducing their current expenditures to below the level of subsistence, 83 percent of the interviewed migrants had succeeded in saving money they had invested or intended to invest in the purchase of land (Carrasco 1990, 180-81).[36] A similar tendency was described by Lentz (forthcoming) in the community of Shamanga, where one of the first objectives of a young migrant couple was to save money to buy a plot of land and build a house in their home community - a sign, in Lentz's view, of the persistence of the ethnic communal consciousness among the migrants.

The persistence of peasant and/or ethnic communal consciousness does not mean, however, that we are we dealing with a 'traditional" or "conservative" form of consciousness. Most Andean peasant families sell at least part of their produce in the market and purchase agricultural chemical inputs, frequently with their wage earnings. Similarly, the ethnic communal identity includes such relatively new elements (new in the context of postwar history) as the assertion of Indian cultural and political rights vis-à-vis the state or pan-Indian consciousness overarching local identities - both products of migrants' experiences in cities or on coastal plantations. León writes in this connection about the Indians' quest for citizenship (León, 1991), while Lentz talks about a new ethnic consciousness (Lentz, forthcoming). Shall we also talk about a new peasant identity the identity of a "rational" peasant coping with the market pressures but stubbornly resisting proletarianization, which in the context of the 1980s and 1990s increasingly means pauperization?[37] In any case, it is plausible that the community members' increased dependence on wages and seasonal migrations do not necessarily obliterate their indigenous or peasant identity but rather result in its modification in accordance with the changing historical circumstances. It is the persistence of this historically conditioned peasant and ethnic identity that explains, to a large extent, the development of land conflicts in the 1980s and 1990s, despite the completion of the transition to capitalist agriculture and despite the official closure of the land reform period.

The 1979 election marked the end of the reformist interlude in Ecuador's history and signaled the adoption of a more market-oriented approach. Pressed by the international financial institutions and confronted with the fall of the country's revenues from oil and banana exports, the Roldós government started moving in the direction of economic neoliberalism, trying to reconcile it with the maintenance of certain

development programs - integrated rural development, for example.[38] Economic neoliberalism enjoyed free reign during the conservative government of Febres Cordero (1984-88), resulting in, among other things, a rapid deterioration in the standard of living of the mass of the population. Febres's social democratic successor, Borja, tried to moderate the established neoliberal economic policies, largely without success. The 1980s and 1990s witnessed a continuous deterioration in the economic conditions of the popular sectors, including the indigenous peasantry. The reduction in banana exports and the sluggish performance of the construction sector undermined their incomes, adding to the impact of a decrease in real minimum wages (Chiriboga 1989, 35-36)). At the same time, the civilian governments stopped even hinting about the possibility of fin-ther land redistribution. The 1979 Law of Agricultural Promotion put an official end to the policy of land reform, and emphasized instead the need to create a stable political climate in rural areas as a precondition for increasing agricultural production.[39]

These developments had a mixed effect on the frequency of land conflicts in Chimborazo. The number of land claims filed with IERAC in the 1980s fell by half as compared to the period of military reformism (1972-1979, see Table 4). Still, it clearly exceeded the number of claims in the period preceding the 1973 reform. Moreover, the downward tendency of the 1980s seems to have reversed at the end the decade, when several years of relative calm gave place to a sudden upsurge in the number of land claims, preceding and following the 1990 uprising. This reversal was especially noticeable in the northern and southern regions, which had played a relatively minor role in previous waves of community mobilization. Contrary to the situation in the 1970s, when land conflicts were concentrated in the central region, the 1980s and 1990s saw such conflicts spread more or less evenly throughout the province.

TABLE 4 NUMBER OF LAND CLAIMS (HOLDINGS OF 20 HECTARES OR MORE) BY YEARS AND REGIONS, CHIMBORAZO, **1971-91**

YEAR	NORTHERN	CENTRAL	SOUTHERN	PROVINCE
1971		2		2
1972		1		1
1973			1	1
1974	1	5	4	10
1975	4	7	4	15
1976	6	26	4	36
1977	5	20	7	32
1978	4	14	4	22
1979	4	10	6	20
1980	2	9	2	13
1981	3	4	2	9
1982	1	18	3	22
1983	2	7	2	11
1984	1	5	1	7
1985	6	9	1	16
1986	3	3	2	8
1987	1	3	5	9
1988	1	1	2	4
1989	2	7	5	14
1990	5	4	8	17
1991*	2	5		7
Total claims	**53**	**160**	**63**	**276**
No. of communities	200	238	76	514
No. of claims per 10 Communities	**2.7**	**6.7**	**7.9**	**5.4**

*January-July.
Source: Archives of the Topographic Division, IERAC, Ministry of Agriculture, Riobamba.

The changes in the geographic site of land conflicts was an indication of a profound social change. In the 1970s, most land claims were directed against the vestiges of the hacienda order, such as haciendas' control of paramos or the persistence of nonwage relations. Typically, the land conflicts involved two categories of land: the paramos, to which community members could get access only as yanaperos, and agricultural plots within the hacienda boundaries, which they worked as sharecroppers. In both cases, the land in question was of low productivity, since the best agricultural land had already been cultivated directly by the owners with the use of wage labour.

This was the case, for example, in the conflict between hacienda Totorillas-Pasñag and seven former huasipunguero community in Guamote.[40] Before the 1964 reform, the hacienda was 5,500 hectares in area, mostly in paramos land. After the suppression of huasipungo, the owner transferred a sector of the paramos to the communities along with the family plots. This transfer, however, did not solve their subsistence problem, and so there was a new wave of peasant mobilization in the 1970s. According to the 1975 study conducted by National Development Corporation (Corporación Nacional de Desarollo, CONADE), the farming of the transferred plots absorbed less than one-third of the family labour power among the members of the communities, with the bulk of family income coming either from seasonal migration or from sharecropping on the hacienda. On the other hand, the segment of panunos transferred to the communities was too small for their livestock. To get access to the hacienda paramos, community members had to work two days a week for the hacienda owner, in addition to letting their sheep graze on the hacienda agricultural lands for five months a year in order to fertilize them with manure. It was these agricultural lands that the peasants were striving for. In 1975 they refused to remove their sheep from the hacienda lands - an action generally equated with land seizure. They also started a case against the hacienda with IERAC and won at least a partial victory. Five hundred hectares of the best agricultural land were reserved for the Ministry of Agriculture to start a model farm (a rather unusual arrangement; in most cases the best lands were proclaimed exempt by IERAC and left to the hacienda owners). The rest of the hacienda, including the paramos and sharecroppers' plots, was transferred to the communities.

While in the 1970s similar conflicts could be seen all over the province (even though they were most typical of the hacienda-dominated areas like Guamote or Quimiag), few were still taking place in the 1980s and 1990s. By that time, capitalist agriculture had spread all over the province, displacing the remnants of the hacienda order: the capitalist farm had finally replaced the hacienda. Most of the pararnos had already been transferred to peasant communities. By and large, the remaining natural pastures were now occupied by the landowners' cattle, while agricultural lands were cultivated by a small number of wage labourers. Many of these were strangers to the area because after the beginning of land conflicts in the area, the landowners had tried to avoid any dealings with the local communities for fear of losing their land. Tkis meant that most of those who were claiming farmland in the 1980s and 1990s had no labour relation with the landowners. In other words, they were claiming land not because they were subject to direct economic exploitation by the landowners, but because they were marginalized in terms of the local economy by the capitalist sector. Moreover, because of the national economic crisis, it was getting more and more difficult for them to find jobs on coastal plantations or in the urban sector, a situation that reinforced their marginalization. Thus, peasants' struggle for land in the 1980s and 1990s appeared increasingly as a struggle against marginalization within the context of a capitalist economy, while in the 1970s it had developed largely as a struggle against the remnants of precapitalist relations.

In both cases, the peasants' objective was land, but the character of their opponents was not the same. Paradoxically, it was harder for peasants to get a private deal with the "progressive" farmers of the 1980s and 1990s than it had been with the remaining 'archaic* landlords in the 1970s. One reason for this increased difficulty was the relatively high quality of farmland in the capitalist sector. In the 1970s, the availability of low-productivity, low-price land in the hacienda sector facilitated private deals between the peasants and the landlords. Much land at that time

was sold by landlords to peasants under so-called transactional acts (actas transaccionales) without any state intervention. These sales, not reflected in IERAC statistics, augmented the total amount of land transferred from the hacienda to the peasant sector in the 1970s, reflecting the ability and willingness of the parties in question to arrive at a compromise -a highly asymmetrical compromise, to be sure, but nevertheless a compromise. In the 1980s and 1990s, similar deals were harder to achieve. In many cases, the landowners, exhausted by continuous confrontations with peasants, were willing to get rid of their land. Their price, however, was generally beyond the reach of the peasants. Often, the landlords preferred to sell their estates to third persons who could pay the price, with the peasants re-directing their claims against the new owners.

As for the IERAC, it was less and less able to serve as an institutional mediator in these conflicts. Chronically underfunded, its institutional goals curtailed, it led a shadowy existence - a stepchild in the country's new economic and political climate dominated by neoliberalism. In the 1980s and 1990s, most of the land claims in Chimborazo came under the clause that dealt with high demographic pressure. Their settlement in favour of the peasants would have contradicted the modernizing, "productivist" logic that had informed IERAC's policies over the past decades and that had led MRAC officials repeatedly to ally themselves with the capitalist farmers. Moreover, such settlements would have required legal clarification, since the high demographic-pressure clause of the 1973 law contradicted the clause in that law that dealt with economic efficiency as well as the 1979 Law of Agricultural Promotion, which protected economically efficient properties from state intervention. Finally, the expropriation of efficient capitalist farms involved a sizeable reimbursement of their owners, while inefficient estates could be expropriated with minimal compensation or none at all. Thus, a fresh infusion of funds would also be necessary. In the face of all these obstacles, IERAC officials found it easier to take the side of the capitalist farmers, proclaiming the properties claimed by peasants exempt. In one year alone (August 1988-October 1989) 423 hectares of land in the province were declared exempt, as compared to 162 hectares confiscated by IERAC (Rosero 1990, appendices 1-3).

The closing of the institutional channel for land redistribution was complemented by the creation of a legal framework for police action against the communities. The 1973 reform had been followed by a wave of violence against peasant communities that laid claim to hacienda land. The violence came mostly from landlords, with the local police either turning a blind eye or intervening on their behalf. In 1974, Chimborazo's newspaper, which generally showed little interest in indigenous and peasant problems, published eleven reports dealing with landlord and/or police violence -against the communities.[41] Typically the perpetrators were hired armed gangs who burnt peasant houses and communal property, killed the community livestock, and issued death threats against community leaders. There were also armed police raids, involving acts of physical aggression and arbitrary detentions.

Similar cases of violence were also registered throughout the 1980s and with more frequency after the 1990 uprising. In addition, however, the collaboration of the landowners and the police was now put on a legal footing with the passing of the 1979 Law of Agricultural Promotion. The law was directed against land seizures, which had been used by communities as a bargaining instrument in their negotiations with landlords and IERAC. The most common form of land seizure was letting community livestock graze within the hacienda's boundaries or cultivating the hacienda land without the consent of the owner.[42] The 1979 Agricultural Promotion Law classified these actions as delinquent acts whose perpetrators could be subject to criminal prosecution. The law also disqualified communities involved in land seizures from receiving any further land from IERAC. Land seizures continued despite the new legislation, though. According to CONAIE, in 1991 at least thirty community leaders in Chimborazo had court charges laid against them as a result of four land seizures in various parts of the province. The relative inefficiency of the 1979 law in stopping the seizures showed that peasants had more fifth in their own ability to press capitalist farmers into selling them the disputed land at an affordable price than in the prospect of IERAC intervention.

Even though in the 1980s and 1990s land conflicts were spread more or less evenly across the province, the upsurge of community militancy was especially noticeable in the southern and northern regions, which had been only slightly affected by the 1973 land reform. The cases of the indigenous community of Shushilcón in the southern region and the two mestizo community of Guayllabamba. in the north illustrate the changing nature of the peasant struggle.

In the 1970s, the owners of the hacienda Shushilcón transferred eighty-four hectares of their lowproductivity land to the former huasipunguero community of the same name, while obtaining exempt status for the best forty-five hectares, which was cultivated with the use of wage labour. With less than two hectares of low-productivity land per family and with little on-farm employment, the communities' members had to rely on seasonal migration as their main source of income. In 1989, they started a land trial in IERAC, using the high demographic-pressure clause. They also argued that most of the farmland had been abandoned by the owners and consequently could be seized under the land reform law's economic inefficiency provisions. To speed up the trial, they seized the property, letting their livestock graze on the allegedly abandoned land. Confronted with the prospect of expropriation, the farm owners offered to sell the land to the community, but the parties could not agree on the price. Eventually, IERAC issued a resolution favourable to the peasants. The owners, however, won the case in the Appeal Court, which found that the farm owners were cultivating the disputed land efficiently in accordance with existing agrarian legislation. The communities' claim about high demographic pressure in the area remained ignored. The community seized the farm once again in 1991, asking the Appeal Court to reconsider the case. The court, however, ratified the previous resolution and laid criminal charges against eighteen community members involved in the seizure. Nevertheless, the seizure continued until the owner finally agreed to sell the hacienda to the community at an affordable price.

A similarly explosive situation arose in the northern region, on the hacienda Guayllabamba, which operated as a combination dairy farm and cattle ranch. The area outside the hacienda was characterized by exceedingly high levels of demographic pressure. Of the two neighbouring mestizo communities, San Antonio de Guayllabamba had 215 families, of which 122 owned plots of land with an average size of 0. 18 hectares; the rest were landless. The other community, San Francisco de Guayllabamba, had 138 families, 96 of which owned on average 0.62 hectares each; the rest were landless. Back in the 1970s, the communities had tried to obtain part of the hacienda's 4,500 hectares under the economic inefficiency clause. MRAC rejected their request, proclaiming the hacienda lands exempt. This did not prevent the communities from starting a new suit in 1982, this time basing their case both on the high demographic pressure in the area and on the hacienda's allegedly inefficient production.[43] In response, IERAC confirmed its previous resolution. The communities started negotiations with the owners about the possibility of purchasing some land within the hacienda. The negotiations, however, stalled, and in 1989 parts of the hacienda were seized by community members organized into the Ruminahui-Guayllabamba, Association. Criminal charges were laid against ten participants; nevertheless, land seizures continued in the following years.

To sum up, the land reform put an end to precapitalist relations in Chimborazo's countryside, while at the same transferring huge tracts of unproductive or marginally productive land to indigenous and mestizo peasant communities. After this the redistributive process came to a halt, and the police force was frequently called in to protect farmers' property rights. The capitalist farmers' grip on the productive land, however, was matched by the extraordinary tenacity with which the communities continued to pursue their land claims year after year. In most cases, the communities had been claiming the land of the same haciendas for decades, using a variety of instruments, from land trials with IERAC to private negotiations with the owners to land seizures. In fact, community land seizures in Chimborazo are rather close to Clausewitz's vision of war as a continuation of politics by other means - the politics of local resources, in this case. The seizures are a most vivid manifestation of the incessant tug-of-war

between communities and landowners, in which the communities have been continuously frustrated in their economic demands, while at the same time increasing their control of the local territorial base and refining their organizational and political skills. The deterioration of the local land and labour situation after the land reform, in combination with the persistence of peasant or ethnic identity and the growth of the communal organizations, explains the continuation of land conflicts into the 1980s and 1990s. But it also explains the communities' increased interest in rural development projects, which became another important target of indigenous and peasant struggles.

Clientelism or Struggle for Power? Communities and Rural Development

While shrinking away from further land redistribution, the Roldós government proclaimed its commitment to the strategy of rural development. Formulated by the World Bank as an uncontroversial and apolitical alternative to land reform, this strategy was designed to upgrade small-scale agriculture, improve social services in rural areas, and promote grassroots community organization under the sponsorship of national and international development agencies.[44] In Ecuador, with its largely Indian peasant population, the rural development strategy took on a strong indigenist overtone, showing a considerable continuity with the government indigenist initiatives prior to the Second World War and the work of the UN Andean Mission in the 1950s.[45] Shaped by ideas of social justice and cultural relativism, in addition to the needs of the expanding market economy, the indigenist policies aimed at the integration of indigenous people into so-called modem society, while also giving them an opportunity to preserve their cultural identity. The indigenist influences added a cultural-educational element to Ecuador's strategy of rural development, manifested most importantly in the introduction of bilingual (Spanish-Quichua) education in the indigenous community, which had previously had only monolingual Spanish schools.

One of the most widely publicized instruments of rural development in Ecuador the Rural Marginal Development Fund (Fondo de Desarrollo Rural Marginal, FODERUMA). Created in 1978 under the umbrella of Ecuador's Central Bank (Banco Central del Ecuador), FODERUMA was supposed to channel financial assistance to the most impoverished sectors of the peasantry in order to promote their commercial development.

By the mid-eighties, FODERUMA had more than a hundred rural development projects, eight of them in Chimborazo (Banco Central Del Ecuador, 1988, 107). The projects combined agricultural credit with assistance for the development of physical infrastructure (roads, irrigation canals) and social services (schools, housing, electricity). They were supposed to be implemented with peasant participation and lead to the strengthening of communal organization.

From the very start, however, FODERUMA's ability to deal with the problem of commercial development was undercut by its limited funding. In the first half of the 1980s FODERUMA's national funds constituted approximately 0.1 percent of the national credit issued by private banks (Jordan Bucheli 1988, 240). This figure is consistent with the data on Chimborazo, where FODERUMA accounted for less than 0.1 percent of the total provincial credit (Banco Central del Ecuador 1985, 55-58; 1988, 15). The relative insignificance of FODERUMA's development funding in the context of the market economy was aggravated by a problem of bureaucratic management and the related difficulty in reaching the target groups.[46] This difficulty manifested itself in FODERUMA's low spending capacity: between 1978 and 1985 FODERUMA spent less than half the available funds (Banco Central del Ecuador, 1985, 25). Thus, ironically, FODERUMA was not only an underfunded but also an underspending agency, which decreased even further the meagre amount of financial assistance directed to the impoverished peasantry. In addition, FODERUMA became caught in a contradiction between its commitment to the elimination of poverty (social objective) and its concerns with the development of commercial agriculture (economic objective). Thus, in Chimborazo it located most of its projects in the better-off cantons of Riobamba and Colta, which are relatively close to the provincial capital, and left the impoverished southern cantons of Guarnote

and Alausí with almost no financial or technical assistance (Banco Central del Ecuador, 1988, 23, 55-58).

The limited scope of FODERUMA's activities raised discontent not only among the communities that had been denied FODERUMA's assistance, but also among those that had obtained it - because it was generally deemed inadequate by community members. A survey conducted by Cadena and Mayorga (1988) in 131 Chimborazo communities where FODERUMA worked revealed that the majority of community members believed that the most important activities of the communal authorities involved: (1) the organization of mingas and assemblies (53 percent of the answers); (2) the search for external institutional support for communal activities (24 percent); and (3) the implementation of community projects (16 percent). Since most community projects were approved by assemblies and carried out through mingas with the financial support of external institutions, it is plausible that most community members saw the communal authorities' main raison d'etre in development project implementation. On the other hand, the survey indicated a considerable amount of frustration in this respect: 60 percent of the respondents expressed dissatisfaction with the communal authorities because the projects implemented under their leadership were considered inadequate or insufficient. When asked about better ways of addressing community needs, two-thirds of the respondents said more government support was required, while one-durd advocated better communal leadership and organization (Cadena and Mayorga 1988, 85,93,94).

Even though Cadena and Mayorga's survey points to the existence of a certain clientelist attitude among the communities working with FODERUMA, it also reveals their profound discontent with FODERUMA's performance and the vision of a strong community organization as a prerequisite of rural development. A similar situation could be seen in the case of communities involved in integrated rural development (IRD) projects - another major instrument of rural development in Ecuador. Since these projects were much larger than FODERUMA's, the government's counterpart in this case was not an individual community, but a federation of communities. In fact, it is generally admitted that the implementation of IRD projects served as a catalyst for the organization of such federations. Even though at first glance these hasty organizational efforts looked like an exercise in clientelist politics, the reality seems to have been more complex.

The national IRD program was presented by its architects as another instrument for incorporating impoverished peasants into commercial development. Organized on a national scale in 1979, this program was put in charge of the Secretariat of Integrated Rural Development (Secretaría de Desarrollo Rural Integral, SEDRI) under the direct control of the presidency, which reflected the importance attributed by the Roldós government to the policy of rural development within its general market-oriented strategy. The Febres Cordero government, by contrast, relegated the IRD program to the backwaters of the Ministry of Social Welfare, a move that, along with cutbacks in government spending, resulted in a loss in the program's initial dynamism (Chiriboga 1989, 7-8). In the mid-1980s, the program included twenty-two projects with a total cost of 13,193 million sucres - almost ten times FODERUMA's funding (Jordan Bucheli 1988, 240, 251). If that still looked like a drop in the bucket of national credit, it was a relatively large drop.

Like FODERUMA, the IRD projects were designed to address the problem of rural poverty. And, again like FODERUMA, they became caught in a contradiction between social and economic concerns. Generally speaking, the IRD projects ended up being used to promote commercial initiatives among the relatively well off peasants in areas close to urban markets (Santana 1983, 76-80). Moreover, while the IRD officials extolled the virtues of peasant participation, in practice they frequently shied away from a meaningful dialogue with indigenous peasant organizations.

The government officials' fear of peasant participation was especially visible in DRI-Guamote - one of Chimborazo's diree IRD projects. It was supposed to benefit 115 impoverished indigenous communities in Guamote with a total membership of twenty-three thousand people. The project

started in 1985 with an ambitious plan for local development, lost almost all its funding several years later because of cutbacks in government spending, and returned to life in the early 1990s after an injection of funds from the Andean Pact Development Corporation (Corporación Andina de Fomento, CAF). The project involved a broad range of activities: credit and technical assistance for small-wale agriculture, livestock, forestry, and commercialization; the construction of roads and irrigation canals; and investment in education, health, child-cue, and drinking water facilities. The main emphasis, however, was on the roads linking indigenous communities to urban markets and on the irrigation infrastructure necessary for the introduction of commercial crops. In 1989-90, these two items accounted for almost 40 percent of the project's total budget.[47]

Like other IRD projects, DRI-Guamote was supposed to develop with the participation of local communities. In the mid-1980s these were represented by the powerful Jatun Ayllu, which had been born out of the land struggles of the 1970s. Jatun Ayllu had been able to exert influence not only over IERAC but also over FODERUMA. Its leaders, for instance, had been able to negotiate an agreement that envisaged participation of community representatives in the elaboration and management of FODERUMA projects, as well as the transfer of part of the communiti ' interest payments on FODERUMA loans back to the communities and Jatun Ayllu.

Given the influence of Jatun Ayllu both at the grassroots level and in its relations with government agencies, the IRD project officials felt apprehensive about their ability to control this organization. As a consequence, they encouraged the creation of a parallel federation, the Guarnote Union of Indigenous Peasants (Uni6n de Campesinos Indigenas de Guamote, UCIG). It was UCIG, rather than Jatun Ayllu, that became the government's partner in the implementation of the IRD project. Its members were granted access to project funds, and its representatives were incorporated into the project's administration. This policy created an appearance of peasant participation while at the same time debilitating, albeit temporarily, the autonomous indigenous peasant federation.

If the manipulative practices of project officials seemed to win the day in Guarnote, they clearly failed in Quimiag, in the northern region. The IRD project in this area had begun in 1977 in response to the persistent requests of the Quimiag communities to complete the irrigation works started under the previous administration. In this case, project officials had opted for cooperation with the independent federation of Quimiag's mestizo and Indian communities - the Central Council of Quimiag (Cabildo Central de Quimiag) reorganized later as the Peasant Union of Quimiag (Uni6n de Campesinos de Quimiag, UNOCAQ). In the 1970s UNOCAQ was able to press IERAC into a massive program of land redistribution, using a combination of negotiation and land seizures. The problem of land persisted, however, since not all communities had been able to get access to land. Development officials expected the IRD project - which was focused on local irrigation - to 'pacify" the militant local communities by switching their attention from land redistribution to rural development. The project was sponsored by a large number of national and international development agencies - Ecuador's National Institute of Hydraulic Resources (INHERI), Ministry of Agriculture, and Ministry of Social Welfare, as well as the US Agency for International Development (US-AID), and CARE. Its centrepiece was the construction of a new main canal that would increase irrigated areas and the introduction of irrigation by sprinklers that would diminish erosion and optimize the use of water. The project also offered credit, technical assistance, and training to local peasants in the area of fruit and vegetable farming (Ministerio de Bienestar Social, 1987).

One of the main objectives of Quimiag's IRD project was to increase local production of vegetables for Riobamba's market. The major beneficiary of this initiative was a segment of relatively prosperous peasants who had benefited from the land redistribution of the 1970s. To the extent that they hired more labourers, however, the impoverished and near landless families unproved their incomes as well, although on a much smaller scale. Moreover, since most impoverished families had small family plots, they were also able to take advantage of the improvements in irrigation and credit or technical

assistance offered to all community members. To be sure, the unequal distribution of the project's benefits gave rise to a certain amount of discontent among poor families. Overall, however, the UNOCAQ leadership was able to retain the support of the majority of community members.

Much of UNOCAQ's success in this regard was due to its aggressive and autonomous policy with regard to development agencies. UNOCAQ not only pressed the government into the continuation of financial support for the project despite the cutbacks in government spending, but was also able to broaden the initial scope of the project, adding such items as electrification, construction of communal houses, provision of child care and, after the outbreak of cholera in 1991, cholera prevention and treatment. These additions mostly benefited the rich peasants. In addressing these new issues, UNOCAQ expanded its initial contacts with development agencies, adding EERSAA (a public corporation involved in rural electrification) and the Ministry of Health to its already long list of partners. It also extended its relations with the Ministry of Social Welfare into the area of childcare. This increased engagement with the state bureaucracy cannot be understood as mere clientelism. To be sure, the communities wanted more and better services (which is hardly surprising, given the urban-rural disparities in their national distribution). But UNOCAQ not only contacted development officials and secured a flow of development funds; it also succeeded in obtaining a considerable amount of decision-making power in terms of project implementation. In other words, UNOCAQ's demand for infrastructure and services was also a bid for control of rural development.

The community leaders' willingness and ability to confront development officials, rather than meekly follow the clientelist rules of the game, became evident at the end of the lean 1980s, when the government began considering the possibility of withdrawing from the area, leaving the project largely in the charge of CARE. This touched off a conflict with UNOCAQ, whose leadership demanded that government support continue. In addition, however, UNOCAQ demanded the expulsion of CARE officials, accusing them of authoritarian behaviour and unresponsiveness to peasant concerns. This demand arose from two problems that emerged in the process of project on. One was what UNOCAQ leaders identified as CARE's policy of benefiting small segments of the local population linked directly to CARE, a policy responsible – in their view - for clientelism and divisions within community organizations. The other problem was the product of a long-standing controversy around the introduction of sprinkler irrigation. Despite its obvious advantages in terms of environmental conservation, the new technique, in the eyes of many local peasants, was fraught with potential problems, such as the clogging of water pipes or difficulties with the replacement of lost or damaged equipment. This caused reluctance among peasants whose fields were located in low-erosion areas to switch from the old and reliable ditches to brand-new fancy sprinklers, a reluctance that project officials apparently handled in a heavy-handed bureaucratic manner. These and other related issues became the subject of a local public debate in which all parties involved participated. The end product of this debate was an agreement signed by UNOCAQ leaders, government representatives, and CARE officials. The agreement confirmed government support for the project, committed CARE officials to work more closely with UNOCAQ, and made sure that the introduction of sprinklers would be conducted on a strictly voluntary basis.[48]

The "war" between UNOCAQ and project officials continued into the 1990s, when it resulted in a demand for the replacement of the project director because of her alleged inefficiency in procuring funds for the project and her authoritarian style of management. This demand was supported by the seizure of the project's offices. As in the previous case, the conflict was solved by the signing of an agreement - this time, one that would replace the unpopular director with a local professional who had earned the communities' confidence.

The conflict between UNOCAQ and project officials was mirrored in a myriad of smaller conflicts surrounding the implementation of community child-care programs. The communities insisted on their right to participate in the selection of social workers (promotoras) to be placed in their communities by the Ministry of Social Welfare, as

well as to remove those who did not "get along" with the communities in question.

Similar controversies - a sign of the communities' increased assertiveness in their relations with the state and international bureaucracy - could also be seen in the area of government education and cultural policies. Education was generally considered by government officials as part of rural development: higher literacy rates were expected to bring about improvements in the efficiency and productivity of peasant agriculture (Sánchez-Parga 1988, 39). At the same time, indigenist influences manifested themselves in the government's commitment - in cooperation with indigenous organizations - to preserve Quichua, spoken mostly by Andean peasants. In 1980, an agreement was signed between the Ministry of Education and the Catholic University in Quito designed to facilitate the training of bilingual *teachers and* develop textbooks in Quichua. This *agreement was* followed by the creation of an ambitious (but underfunded) program of bilingual education. The program was run by the Board of Bilingual Education (Dirección Bilingue), a new body formed by representatives of the Ministry of Education and indigenous leaders from CONAIE. In 1985 the board supplemented its meagre budget by signing a cooperation agreement with the German government. The resulting Bilingual Education Project (EBI) included 74 out of the country's several hundred bilingual schools (de Vries 1988, 56). In Chimborazo, the Board ran 319 elementary schools and 7 *high schools*. Only a lucky few, however, operated within the EBI project; the rest had to confront a severe shortage of funds.

While expressing its willingness to cooperate with indigenous organizations in the area of education and cultural policies, the government made a continuous effort to separate *the problem* of indigenous culture from that of the economic conditions of the indigenous people, and especially from the explosive problem of land.[49] As was also the case with rural development, however, the government's attempts to give the bilingual education programs an uncontroversial, technical character largely failed in the face of the indigenous peasant mobilization fuelled by land conflicts. In effect, the bilingual education program became an additional weapon in the communities' struggle for control over rural development.

Much of the controversy surrounding bilingual education in Chimborazo developed in Cacha - the former stronghold of *the D*uchicela dynasty, transformed over time into an impoverished *migrant* community. Given the absence of large estates and the general insignificance of agricultural activities in this area, the communities, represented by the Federation of the Indigenous Councils of Cacha (Federación de los Cabildos Indigenas de Cacha), concentrated on development projects related mostly to social infrastructure. In 1987 the community completed an electrification project, conducted *through m*ingas and with EERSAA's financial and technical assistance. The same year they improved the road connecting Cacha with Riobamba, and started the construction of a drinking water system with the support of SWISSAID and the Ecuadorian Institute for Health Works (Instituto Ecuatoriano de Obras Sanitarias, IEOS). This project, however, had to be suspended because of IEOS's failure to supply the required materials. In 1991 the discontent with government procrastination was spurred by the outbreak of a cholera epidemic in Cacha, attributable largely to the lack of safe drinking water.

Communal works were accompanied by the Central Council's efforts to promote the indigenous cultural tradition. The federation organized a number of artistic events and spiritual ceremonies. It also promoted the development of indigenous crafts and secured Cacha's active participation in the national bilingual education program. All Cacha's primary schools (eighteen in total) and its only *high school* were bilingual - that is, their curriculum included courses in Quichua and their staff included bilingual Quichua-speaking teachers of Indian origin along with monolingual mestizo teachers. This in itself became a source of conflict, not so much between the Indian and mestizo teachers, as between the latter and the local communities. The mestizo teachers in Cacha's bilingual schools resented having been placed under the control of the Board of Bilingual Education. Apart from the loss of certain professional privileges, such as the right to be transferred to more conveniently located schools

after several years of teaching in remote areas, they found themselves under the supervision of not only government officials but also indigenous organizations. In addition to a partial loss of what they saw as their professional autonomy, this change undermined their privileged social status, making them accountable to community leaders and triggering an avalanche of questions and criticisms from community members whose children they taught. In 1989 the mestizo teachers in Chimborazo's bilingual schools organized a province-wide campaign rejecting the participation of indigenous communities in the administration of bilingual education, which in turn provoked a highly negative reaction from the communities. In Cacha, these animosities manifested themselves in open confrontations until the Central Council organized a forum for local mestizo teachers and indigenous community representatives, where both parties could discuss their grievances and try to reach an agreement on how the local bilingual schools should be operated.

The communities' new concern with rural development was reflected in the changing pattern of the claims and denunciations they had published in the local newspaper (see Table 5). One should certainly take the newspaper information with caution. To begin with, as far as community discontent was concerned, the reports clearly showed only the tip of the iceberg.[50] Moreover, communities with a strong record of public relations, generally located close to Riobamba, were much more likely to figure in the reports than remote communities were. Finally, the selection and presentation of the material was most probably influenced by the personal biases of editors and reporters as well as by changes in local public opinion and the national political climate. With all these qualifications in mind, the changing content of the newspaper reports can still be considered as a rough indication of the communities' changing political agenda.

TABLE 5: COMMUNITIES' CLAIMS AND DENUNCIATIONS REPORTED IN EL ESPECTADOR, BY REGIONS AND YEARS, CHIMBORAZO, 1973-77 AND 1987-91

YEARS/REGIONS	TOTAL NO. OF REPORTS	ISSUES			
		Land	Credit and infrastruc-ture	Abuses	Other
1973-77					
Northern	14	7	10	6	-
Central	8	4	-	5	2
Southern	10	5	3	5	3
without info.	3	3	-	-	
Province	35	19	13	17	5
1987-91					
Northern	28	5	19	10	1
Central	20	9	7	7	1
Southern	10	7	2	4	-
Province	58	21	28	21	2

*Includes claims and denunciations made by individual communities and inter-communal organizations. If one report contains several claims/denunciations, each is counted separately in accordance with its category. If the same claim/denunciation is made by the same organization in several reports, it is counted as one. One case in which the same report referred to the communities of two regions was counted twice.

Source: El Espectador.

As can be seen from the table, in the five years following the 1973 land reform the local newspaper reported thirty-five instances of community making claims or denunciations. The issue most frequently raised in the reports was land. The land claims were often accompanied by denunciations of abuses, referring in most cases to physical violence involving hacienda owners and local police. Fifteen years later (1991) the number of reported land claims remained almost the same.

The number of denunciations of abuses, on the other hand, increased and the nature of the reported abuses had changed somewhat. Some of them - generally those associated with the lingering land conflicts - were similar to the denunciations of the previous period. Others, however, referred to arbitrary behavior or "inattention" on behalf of state and elected officials.[51] The most visible change, however, was in the number of claims for infrastructure and services related to rural development. Over the 1970s and 1980s this number more than doubled. Most of these claims came from the northern region. The concentration of the reported demands for physical and social infrastructure in the north might be influenced by the proximity of the provincial capital. However, it might also be the product of a higher level of commercialization and depeasantization in this part of the province. It is plausible that the well off small commercial producers would be more interested in agricultural credit and physical infrastructure than in access to additional land. For the near-landless seasonal migrants, on the other hand, agricultural infrastructure and services would make little sense without better access to land. However, even in the absence of land redistribution they would still be interested in social services (safe drinking water, electricity, education) - partly because of their greater similiarity with urban standards of living. They would also be interested in new sources of nonagricultural income, such as crafts or small processing plants. In other words, land in Chimborazo was still an important issue, especially for near-landless communities. But so was community access to infrastructure and services. Along with the persistent demand for land, such access formed part of the indigenous and peasant consciousness - a new community consciousness. As mentioned earlier, few of Chimborazo's community practiced communal control of land, but virtually all of them had some sort of communal infrastructure. In fact, it is possible that in some cases the communal control of infrastructure had replaced the communal control of land as the material basis of community consciousness.

To sum up, there is little doubt that rural development policies spurred the growth of clientelisim in relations between the community and the state. This growth, however, was hindered by at least two factors. To begin with, the state did not always have the resources to maintain its clientelist network. The government's financial commitment to rural development programs was insignificant from the very start, and seemed to deteriorate over time. Developed during the period of the oil boom, the rural development programs soon started to fade into oblivion in the context of national economic recession. The expectations that they had created among indigenous and peasant communities could not easily be met by the development agencies. This failure caused a considerable amount of community discontent - a discontent that can be properly understood only in the context of the rapid growth of communal organization and the communities' struggles for land. Even though at first glance it looked like the product of a sense of relative deprivation, developed in a community version of the "revolution of rising expectations,' the actual sources of this discontent lay much deeper. The wellsprings of this discontent were related to the indigenous tradition of communal control of local resources - a tradition that had largely been lost in the area of land tenure, but which seemed to be flourishing in the realm of communal infrastructure. In effect, many communities in Chimborazo had refused the role of passive recipients of government favours and demanded their share of local decision-making power and local resources. Thus, while government development policies did create a tendency for clientelism, they also spurred community struggles for the control of rural development. These struggles were a continuation, rather than the antithesis, of land struggles. Both formed part of the communities' quest for power and resources. Both contained a communal alternative to the postreform order based on capitalist agriculture and state control of infrastructure. In this sense, the community movement in Chimborazo challenged not only the distribution of power and resources in the province, but also the Western liberal-technocratic vision of development.

Conclusion

Community mobilization in Chimborazo reached its peak during the 1990 uprising called by CONAIE and supported by UCAE. Its success in terms of grassroots participation came as a surprise not only

to Chimborazo's urban mestizo population but also to many indigenous and peasant leaders, who did not expect such a massive turnout. According to local leaders' estimates, between 150,000 and 200,000 people (roughly 70 percent of Chimborazo's rural population) participated in the uprising. The uprising lasted seven days, during which time the communities blocked the roads leading to the provincial capital, cutting it off from its food supplies. After one of the Indian protesters was killed by the police, the indigenous communities staged a march on Riobamba with the participation, according to the indigenous leaders, of 60,000 people (20,000, according to the local press). Twenty-five military and police personnel were captured and later set free by indigenous communities in the south of the province, but generally speaking the uprising was of a peaceful character. Fundamentally, it was a political statement, a demonstration of communal strength, designed to press local and national power groups into negotiations. The sixteen points presented by CONAIE as its political platform and supported by Chimborazo's communities included such demands as land for the land-hungry communities (point number one on CONAIE's agenda); an improved supply of safe drinking water and water for irrigation; better funding for bilingual education; creation of provincial and regional credit agencies under the control of indigenous organizations; and initiation or completion of scheduled community projects. An important national demand was that the national Constitution be amended to proclaim Ecuador a multinational state. While at the time of the uprising this demand probably had more national than local significance, it was closely related to the local-level demands for cultural rights and community control of local resources.[52]

It is generally agreed that the 1990 uprising made the Boda government more willing to negotiate with the community organizations. At the national level it was followed by several rounds of Wks between CONAIE and government representatives. In Chimborazo it led to a series of meetings - between the provincial federations and IERAC -designed to decide the outcome of extant land conflicts. These meetings were complemented by others with INBERI, in charge of local irrigation projects; with IEOS, responsible for the drinking water facilities; and with EERSAA, involved in rural electrification. The question remained, though, whether the government officials were negotiating in good faith. To begin with, despite the long rounds of discussions and negotiations, little progress was made either in terms of land redistribution or with regard to community projects.

Furthermore, simultaneously with the negotiations, the rural areas of the province witnessed a rapid process of militarization. After the uprising, the Galapagos Brigade, stationed in Riobamba, conducted local manoeuvres, which the brigade commander described as a regular military exercise, but which nevertheless involved a spectacular show of military strength. Most importantly, the brigade started a civic-military campaign, imitating some aspects of the integrated rural development strategy. Thus, it became involved in building local roads and training community workers or peasant leaders. The brigade used military vehicles for the transportation of medicine, and posted military teachers in some of the understaffed community schools, donating books and school supplies, building chapels, and sending military chaplains "for community visits." It even organized so-called Indian Olympic Games, which took place at the stadium in Riobamba under the watchful eye of the local military and police. Overall, the military became better acquainted with the operation of local communities and in some cases gained acceptance among the community members.

The civic-military campaign raised opposition among indigenous and peasant leaders associated with CONAIE and UCAE. By contrast, many AIECH leaders saw in it a welcome substitute for the government development programs, tainted as they were by procrastination, lack of resources, and general inefficiency. While the military actually displayed considerable technical skill, especially in building roads, it is quite possible that the physical infrastructure they were budding could also be used as an infrastructure for repression.

To conclude, Chimborazo's community movement experience casts doubt on the characterization of the peasant sector as "functional" to global capitalism. To be sure, Chimborazo's communities supplied coastal plantations and the cities with abundant cheap

labour, subsidizing in this way the growth of the capitalist economy. At the same time, though, the peasant sector clearly proved *dysfunctional* to capitalism in political terms. Organized into community and intercommunity federations, Chimborazo's peasantry challenged the established order, which was based on the collaboration of private agricultural enterprise and the state. It should be emphasized that these peasants confronted capitalism not where they were subject to exploitative wage relations (on the coast or in the cities), but rather at home, in the Andes, where they were increasingly marginalized in terms of the local economy by the capitalist restructuring of the hacienda sector. While depending largely on their income from seasonal migration, the semiproletarianized peasants were fighting mostly for control of land and rural development, with the objective of gaining greater productive and decision-making autonomy in relation to both the capitalist sector and the state. This situation calls for a rethinking of the relation between the transition to capitalism and agrarian political mobilization. While liberating the peasantry from the oppressive power of semifeudal landlords, the capitalist transition does not necessarily create .proletarian" consciousness among semiproletarianized peasants. Rather, it may facilitate their organization on the basis of their ethnic and/or peasant communal identity, as was actually the case in Chimborazo.

Following the line of argument developed by Wolf in his early writings, communal organization in Chimborazo is sometimes seen as an instrument of the dominant classes and the state, designed to perpetuate the economic exploitation of the peasantry. In a similar vein, the growth of intercommunal federations in connection with state rural development policies is considered a manifestation of clientelism. While these views reflect an important aspect of local politics, they underestimate the communities' willingness and ability to act as autonomous actors with regard to both the dominant classes and the state bureaucracy. The land struggles and conflicts over rural development that have been discussed in tins paper are an indication of the communities' propensity to act independently on behalf of their members. Moreover, despite an apparent contradiction between the communities' centuries-old struggle for land and their relatively recent interest in infrastructure and services, the two are intrinsically linked together. They are both part of the historic tradition that puts the community in control of collective goods, the, list of which is growing longer and longer - pastures, irrigation ditches, roads, chapels, schools, drinking water facilities, child-care centres, and so on. Thus, even though this bid for land and infrastructure may seem to be an economic struggle, it is essentially a political struggle, a struggle for the right to organize local development in accordance with the community 's needs.

The struggle for control of land and rural development involves both indigenous and mestizo communities, but it is especially strong in the case of the former. Subject to centuries of ethnic discrimination and cultural assimilation, the indigenous communities have nevertheless been able to evolve an alternative project of local development based on die supremacy of community needs. Directed against the predominance of capitalist agriculture and state control of local infrastructure - the two pillars of the postreform. Andean order - the communities' project questions the prevalent Western assumptions on which the country's development strategies are based. While the historical roots of this project lie in the indigenous Andean tradition, it has also been influenced by non-indigenous actors, including the progressive church, the political left, and national and international development officials.

The concerns of the indigenous people are echoed in the mestizo communities, which developed outside the traditional indigenous culture, but share the indigenous peasants' interest in communal control of local resources. In fact, the community agenda of the 1980s and 1990s is a new ethnic and peasant agenda, combining the demand for land with a demand for rural development compatible with the local culture and reflecting both the Andean historic tradition and more recent political and religious influences.

Paradoxically, the state is an indispensable counterpart in many communal initiatives designed to enhance communal decision-making autonomy and control of local resources. The relation between the communities and the state, therefore,

is ambiguous rather than straightforwardly confrontational or unabashedly clientelistic. In a way, this relation is reminiscent of a tug-of-war with one party, the state, being obviously stronger than the other but, in the context of the 1980s and early 1990s, constrained by the democratic political conventions and vestiges of the indigenist-developmentalist discourse. As for the communities, they are using their newly acquired strength to exert pressure on the government through negotiation and direct action. This pattern has been visible at the national level, with the political negotiations between CONAIE leaders and government representatives gaining momentum from the 1990 uprising. The same pattern can be seen on the local scene, where land conflicts, frequently supported by land seizures, have generally taken the form of land trials and negotiations with landowners. Similarly, local conflicts over rural development have typically been solved through meetings and discussions with development officials.

Thus, negotiation rather than confrontation seems to be the preferred strategy of indigenous and peasant communities. The success of negotiations, however, depends to a large extent on the willingness and ability of the national government to make economic and cultural concessions to the community movement. Thus willingness and ability are limited by the government's increasingly scant resources and its entrenched predilection for capitalist agriculture and bureaucratic controls. The degree to which the government is willing and able to make such concessions is Further curtailed by the perception by urban and rural mestizo elites of the demands of the primarily Indian community of the Andes as a threat to the mestizos' cultural supremacy. In addition, the communities' quest for control of local resources, reflected in CONAIE's recent demand for Indian self-determination, is frequently portrayed by the military and conservative civilian circles as a threat to the Ecuadorian state. As for the alternatives to negotiation, the most probable one, especially given the existing correlation of forces, is a military-repressive approach - to which the civil-military action in Chimborazo might be just a prelude.

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Endnotes

[1] An excellent analysis of this phenomenon in Guatemala is provided by Smith (1984, 1990).

[2] For a discussion of the evolution of the peasantry in the process of capitalist transformation in the Latin American countryside, see Murmis (1981), Pearse (1975), Feder (1980), Goodman and Redclift (1981), and Llambi (1990), in addition to de Janvry et al. (1989). For a discussion of employment trends, see Larrea (1991).

[3] The limited, technocratic nature of most Latin American land reforms is discussed by Lehmann (1978) and Grindle (1986). The role of land reforms in the transition to capitalist agriculture is analysed by de Janvry (1982, 1984a).

[4] The integrated rural development strategy and its effects on the peasantry are discussed by Ruttan (1984), Galli (1981a, 1981b), Grindle (1996), and de Janvry (1984b).

[5] See Pard (1990, 85-86), Grzybowski (1990, 22), and Zamosc (1990, 52-53).

[6] See Montoya (1989), Garcia-Sayan (1982), and Rosero (1990).

[7] Zamosc (1989) writes in this connection about the fragmentation of peasant struggles in Colombia; Chiriboga (1986a) talks about the regional 'decentralization" of the peasant movement in Ecuador; while G6nrz and Echenique (1988) mention an increasing difficulty in aggregating peasant demands in Chile.

[8] The land reform in Peru, for example, is frequently seen as an instrument of social and political control (Valderrama 1982; Petras and Havens 1981; Korovkin 1990). A similar perspective is adopted by Galli in her analysis of IRD programs in Colombia (Galli 1981a).

[9] For an excellent discussion of the relations between ethnic and class conflicts as well as an analysis of the development of class struggle in indigenous areas of Mexico, see Schryer (1990).

[10] See, for example, Rasnake (1988), Rivera Cusicanqui (1990), Smith (1990), and Lentz (forthcoming).

[11] An analysis of the evolution of the Catholic church goes beyond the scope of this study. See Lynch (1991) and Keog (1990), among others.

[12] The other two are the coastal province of Guayas and the province of Loja in the southern Andes (IERAC 1989, 2).

[13] Chiriboga et al. 1989, appendix 5.

[14] The other one was the province of Imbabura in the northern highlands. Indian communities in Imbabura, however, are strongly involved in crafts, while Chimborazo's communities rely almost entirely on a combination of family agriculture and work for wages.

[15] Burgos (1970, 31) traces the boundary between the "indigenous" and the "acculturated" areas south of Riobamba, with the southern part of canton Riobamba being part of the indigenous area.

[16] For a discussion of the origin and evolution of the commercial hacienda in Ecuador, see Guerrero (1983, 1991a), Barsky (1988), Murmis (1980), and Llovet et al. (1986). The hacienda in Chimborazo is discussed in JUNAPLA-BID (1973) and Sylva (1986).

[17] These figures do not take into account private sales of the hacienda land. Some peasant families were able to improve their access to land as a result of private deals with the hacienda owners.

[18] This process in Chimborazo was described by Turner (1990). For a discussion of similar experiences in other parts of the country, see Bustamante and Prieto (1986).

[19] For an insightful analysis of the changing power relations in the rural areas of the province of Imbabura, see Rosero (1982). The development of communal organizations in Ecuador after the 1964 land reform is analysed from different angles by Rosero (1990), Chiriboga (1986a), Santana (1983), SAnchez-Parga (1990), and Ibarra (1987).

[20] The number of officially recognized communities cited in Ecofuturo (1990) - 473 in total, is somewhat lower than the one registered in the archives of the Ministry of Agriculture in Quito. The relative weakness of cooperative organization in the Ecuadorian Andes is discussed by Haubert (1990).

[21] For a discussion of indigenous community in Chimborazo, see Iturralde (1980) and Lentz (forthcoming). Indigenous communities in the province of Imbabura are studied by Rosero (1982) and Guerrero (1991b). Indigenous communities of Cotopaxi are discussed by SAnchez-Parga (1986). For a general analysis of communal organizations in Ecuador, see Chiriboga (1986b).

[22] These changes gave rise to a new constellation of local power groups, with the urban elites (traders, moneylenders, some government officials and public employees, etc.) looking for an alliance with capitalist agricultural producers - the new owners of the former hacienda lands. In other words, the disintegration of the "unholy alliance" redefined, rather than destroyed, the relations of power developed over the pre-reform period.

[23] For a critical discussion of MAE's experiences in Chimborazo, see Burgos (1970).

[24] According to his estimates, in the late 1980s AIECH's cooperatives commercialized between 25 and 30 percent of the provinces's agricultural produce. Its transportation cooperatives had approximately sixty trucks, and its credit cooperatives had more than eighteen hundred members (Santana 1990, 207-208).

[25] This argument was developed, for instance, by Barsky (1988), Velasco (1979), and Guerrero (1983).

[26] See IERAC (1980, 1985), Barsky (1988), and Zevallos (1990). For a discussion of the general context of Ecuador's economic policies, see Lefeber (1985) and North (1985).

[27] Between 1972 and 1983, the high-demographic-pressure clause was used only ten times in Chimborazo, as compared to hundreds of cases based on the economic inefficiency of haciendas (Martfnez 1985, 1).

[28] Zevallos and Chiriboga cite slightly different figures. According to Zevallos (1990, 44), between 1964 and 1985, 8 percent of national farmland was redistributed via land reform, while Chiriboga (1988, 44) indicates a total of 10.8 percent for the 1964-85 period.

[29] The survey was conducted in 1990 on the sixteen expropriated estates that together account for 20 percent of the provincial land affected by the land reform. The surveyed areas are deemed representative of the provincial situation. See Ecofuturo (1990, 78).

[30] According to the Central Bank, in 1988, 310,000 of Chimborazo's 641,000 hectares of land were considered farmland. Only 167,000 of these 310,000 hectares could be used as agricultural land. According to the same source, the amount of land transferred by IERAC to peasants between 1966 and 1988 was 125,000 hectares (Banco Central del Ecuador 1988, 89, 90). If unofficial estimates are correct, then only 25,000 of these 125,000 hectares should be considered farmland, and only 4,000 qualified as agricultural land - 8 and 2 percent, respectively, of the provincial totals.

[31] The area of traditional food crops (wheat, barley, and potatoes) decreased over the same period of time from 70,800 to 67, 1000 hectares (Ecofuturo 1990, 24). This relatively slow decline is probably due to the fact that the trend towards a massive conversion to livestock production in the former hacienda sector was offset by a continuous expansion of food production in the peasant one. An increasing number of near-landless families in Chimborazo found themselves forced to grow food crops higher and higher in the mountains, in the paramos zone, traditionally used for grazing and wood collection. This in turn accelerated the process of erosion, transforming marginally productive lands into unproductive ones.

[32] Stories were circulating, for example, about hacienda owners "borrowing" cattle immediately before IERAC's inspections and returning the animals to their owners after the inspection was over.

[33] For a discussion of recent trends in rural employment in Ecuador, see Chiriboga (1989) and Martínez (1994, 1989). According to Chiriboga (1989, 24), the proportion of agricultural labourers working for wages in Ecuador decreased from 266,000 in 1974 to 221,000 in 1982. While not all of this decrease can be explained with reference to the expansion of livestock production (mechanization of food crops was also a factor), it certainly played an important role in the deterioration of rural employment.

[34] The parroquia - the parish - is the smallest administrative unit in Ecuador.

[35] This estimate is based on surveys conducted in the 1980s by the Ministry of Agriculture in the communities Cacha San Amulah, Cacha San Pedro, and Cacha Obraje; see respective community files of the Ministry of Agriculture.

[36] Farell (1985), who studied rural migrants in Quito, arrives at a conclusion similar to Carrasco's.

[37] A heated academic debate on peasant rationality was triggered by Popkin's critique of Scott's work on the moral economy of the peasant (see Popkin 1979, and Scott 1976). It is arguable, however, that like the rest of humankind, peasants are both "rational' and "traditional," depending on the nature of the issue involved and that in fact they may reinforce rather than conflict with each other.

[38] For a discussion of the agrarian crisis in Ecuador, see Chiriboga (1985). On the national economic crisis, see Falconi et al. (1990).

[39] Paradoxically, the shift to neoliberal economics and political conservatism was accompanied in Ecuador and other Andean countries by a consolidation of liberal democracy (see Conaghan et al. 1990). Moreover, in Ecuador, these changes went hand in hand with increased access to the national and local institutional arenas for indigenous people. In 1979, the electoral franchise was extended to the monolingual Quichua-speaking ("illiterate") population. In some areas, such as Colta in

Chimborazo, the indigenous representatives held a majority in the local municipal councils. In others, such as Cacha, members of indigenous communities were appointed as local government officials (teniente politico) - still another blow to the "unholy alliance.

[40] Chismaute, Gualipite, Cochaloma, Carabamba, Yacupamba, Santa Teresita, and Totorillas.

[41] El Espectador, 24 and 26 January; 17, 24 (two reports), and 25 March; 6 August; 18 and 29 September; 20 and 29 October.

[42] Indigenous peasants themselves used the term "possession" (posesión), which reflects more accurately the basically peaceful character of these seizures.

[43] According to the communities, the hacienda owners did not fulfill the production plans they had submitted to IERAC as proof of the hacienda's economic efficiency.

[44] In Ecuador, the strategy of rural development involved an increase in government cooperation with international development agencies such as the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, and the UN World Food Program. The strategy also involved a greater reliance on bi-lateral aid – mostly of Western European origin. The role of the foreign agencies in rural development has been increasing since the end of the oil boom, as the Ecuadorian government has seemed to be less and less able or willing to fulfill its financial commitments.

[45] For a discussion of indigenism in Latin America, see Diaz Polanco (1982). Indigenist policies in Ecuador are analyzed by Ibarra (1987, 171-176). The role of MAE in Ecuador is discussed by Rubio Orbe (1987); MAE's projects in Chimborazo are examined by Burgos (1970).

[46] For a critical analysis of the Ecuadorian state bureaucracies involved in rural development, see Black (1985). For a discussion of FODERUMA in Chimborazo, see Cadena and Mayorga (1988).

[47] El Espectador, 11 January 1991.

[48] This controversy was widely documented in the local press; see April and May 1989 issues of El Espectador.

[49] Santana (1983) and Ibarra (1987) make this point in their analysis of government cultural policies.

[50] Compare, for example, the number of land claims in Tables 4 and 5.

[51] Thus, in Calpi, indigenous peasants protested the arbitrary collection of taxes on small properties exempt from taxation by law; in Cicalpa, they denounced unspecified local authorities for their continual refusal to visit communities that needed their support. In Paquibug, indigenous communities denounced members of Chimborazo's Provincial Council who "appeared unexpectedly with offers to implement projects, but then disappeared" in the same precipitous and mysterious fashion (Espectador, 18 October 1989, 11 February 1990, 10 April 1991).

[52] For an analysis of the 1990 uprising from CONAIE's viewpoint, see Macas (1991).